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[975] 
Justice Roger J. Traynor, Pragmatism, and the 
Current California Supreme Court 
STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN† 
California Supreme Court Justice Roger J Traynor entered the debated between pragmatists and 
formalists, siding with the former in both his scholarly writings and in his judicial opinions, 
especially in torts. In this Article, I explore what I have identified as the leading torts decisions of 
the California Supreme Court involving personal injury or death in the past twenty years. I first 
provide background on the rise of strict product liability and an explanation of what I see as the 
current California Supreme Court’s misguided reliance on the Rowland factors, which promote 
the treatment of “no breach” cases as “no duty” cases. In Part II, I demonstrate the prominence 
of pragmatism in the Court’s recent decision-making, but not the sort of pragmatic thinking that 
Traynor expressed. In Part III, I speculate as to how Traynor might have wanted these recent 
cases resolved based on his pragmatic endorsement of enterprise liability.  
 
 †  Roger J. Traynor Professor of Law, U.C. Berkeley Law. Many thanks to Hayley MacMillen for superb 
research assistance. 
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I.  SETTING THE STAGE 
Professor Ursin explores the twentieth-century conflict between what he 
terms the “pragmatists” and the “formalists” (or “legal process” devotees), 
situating California Supreme Court Justice Roger J. Traynor in this debate by 
placing him firmly in the pragmatist camp.1 Ursin emphasizes Traynor’s 
commitment to “enterprise liability,” especially in tort law cases, as reflecting 
the Justice’s pragmatic outlook.2  
To Ursin, a central difference between the pragmatists and the formalists 
lies in their respective attitudes toward judicial activism.3 Pragmatists take into 
account contemporary social policy considerations when making their decisions 
in both tort and constitutional law cases.4 Formalists believe that judges are ill-
suited to make these judgments and that judicial decisions should not rest on 
what are better understood as legislative or administrative considerations. In 
their view, judges should rely on deeply held basic principles of justice.5  
However, in the common law personal injury and death cases that make up 
the heart of tort law, judges are forced to “make” law every time a new set of 
facts comes before them.6 Judges from either camp must be activists to some 
degree. As I see it, the difference in their approaches has to do with what sorts 
of arguments they believe are appropriate for a court to offer in defense of its 
decisions. 
In 1999, I published an article demonstrating how the conservative-leaning 
court of the previous thirteen years had turned back the prior tide of pro-plaintiff 
decisions.7 A key feature of the torts jurisprudence of the 1986–1999 period was 
the court’s renewed reliance on “rules” governing liability, which were pro-
defendant in their nature, and its accompanying rejection of the more open-
ended “standard” of “due care” that had increased the role of juries in the more 
pro-plaintiff era. 8  
In this Article, I explore what I have identified as the leading torts decisions 
of the California Supreme Court in the twenty years since 1999. I first provide 
background on the rise of strict product liability and an explanation of what I see 
as the California Supreme Court’s misguided reliance on the Rowland factors, 
which promote the treatment of “no breach” cases as “no duty” cases. In Part II, 
I examine the leading torts decisions of the past twenty years using Professor 
Ursin’s analytical structure to examine the function of pragmatism in the court’s 
 
 1. Edmund Ursin, Roger Traynor, the Legal Process School, and Enterprise Liability, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 
1101, 1132–1137 (2020). 
 2. Id. at 1130. 
 3. Id. at 1138–1143. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id.  
 6. Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent California Experience with “New” 
Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 455, 455–56 (1999). 
 7. Id. at 455. 
 8. Id. at 461. 
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decision-making. In Part III, I speculate as to how Traynor might have wanted 
recent cases resolved based on his pragmatic endorsement of enterprise liability. 
A. THE RISE OF STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY 
In Traynor’s concurrence in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. in 1944, 
perhaps his most famous opinion, he used several highly pragmatic arguments 
to make the case for what has become known as strict product liability.9 Gladys 
Escola, an employee of Tiny’s Waffle Shop in Merced, California, had been 
loading Coca-Cola bottles into a refrigerator when one of the bottles exploded, 
injuring her hand.10 There was no evidence linking the explosion to the specific 
negligence of any employee of the Coca-Cola bottling company that made the 
product (although there was also testimony that no one at the waffle shop had 
been careless in handling the bottle, either).11   
Rather than approach Escola as a negligence case, as the majority did, 
Traynor proposed that it would be far better social policy to impose liability on 
the makers/sellers of defective products for injuries caused by their products, 
regardless of whether plaintiffs could prove that those makers/sellers were at 
fault.12 This outlook would upend years of tort thinking that had largely 
cemented the fault principle, expressed in the doctrines surrounding negligence 
law, as the foundation on which tort claims were analyzed.13 
Traynor’s thinking meshed well with that of Yale Law School Professor 
Fleming James, Jr., a leader in the academy, who viewed the activities of modern 
society as an inevitable source of all sorts of accidents in which the injurer might 
or might not be at fault.14 Enterprises engaged in activities leading to accidental 
injuries typically profited from those activities, but all too often, existing 
doctrine did not hold them legally liable for the injuries they caused. “Enterprise 
liability” thinking could change this. Specifically, enterprise liability re-
envisioned tort law as a mechanism for providing social insurance against the 
risk of accidental injury and death from defective products. In James’s view, 
endorsed by Traynor, tort law could step in and fill an important gap left by 
Social Security.15 Congress had enacted the Social Security Act in 1935 to cover 
 
 9. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–44 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurrence). 
 10. Id. at 437–38 (Traynor, J., concurrence). 
 11. See id. at 438–39 (Traynor, J., concurrence). 
 12. See id. at 440–44 (Traynor, J., concurrence). 
 13. Strict liability did attach to “abnormally dangerous activities” at this point, but this exception was 
limited to a small number of acts that imposed the risk of enormous harm to great numbers of people regardless 
of whether due care had been taken, such as dynamite blasting. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 519 cmt. b 
(AM. LAW INST. 1938). 
 14. Fleming James Jr., Some Reflections on the Bases of Strict Liability, 18 LA. L. REV. 293, 296 (1958) 
(“[The modern accident] is a far cry from the typical accident of a century ago. It is no longer a matter between 
neighbors wherein the loss must be borne by one or the other of them. It is usually the by-product of commercial 
or industrial enterprise, or of motoring.”). 
 15. Fleming James, Jr., The Future of Negligence in Accident Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 911, 916 (1967). 
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retirees’ income needs,16 expanding the program in 1939 to cover the income 
needs of dependent surviving family members after a covered worker’s death.17 
But through the 1940s and 1950s, there was no coverage for the income needs 
of disabled workers and their families, and there was no national coverage for 
the health care needs of injured people. By 1960, Social Security began to 
replace some of the lost income of workers who became totally disabled,18 but 
there was and there remains no Social Security coverage for lost income due to 
partial disability. And, of course, Social Security itself does not address medical 
expenses. 
Traynor and James’s view was not altogether original thinking. The idea 
of holding private enterprises responsible for injuries that arose from their 
activities had already been deployed by the workers’ compensation systems that 
states began to adopt in the Progressive Era, mainly in the 1910s. Even then, 
scholars like Jeremiah Smith foresaw that workplace injuries need not be the 
only ones that a modern social insurance plan could cover.19 Why not other 
accidental injuries as well? After all, the worker is in need of compensation 
whether her injury occurs while she is on the job, at home, or out and about in 
society. In the period between states’ embrace of workers’ compensation and 
Traynor’s Escola concurrence, several legislative proposals called for expanding 
the workers’ compensation model to, for example, public transport injuries,20 or 
to automobile injuries.21 But these proposals had made no political headway by 
the middle of the century, adding to the allure of using the common law to bring 
about enterprise liability via a dramatic expansion of when strict liability would 
apply. 
Formalist thinkers opposed this approach.22 It seemed to them to involve 
judges acting too much like legislators. In the formalist view, the role of courts 
was to stick to tradition and fit their decisions into the existing doctrinal network, 
even in new sorts of cases. Personal moral responsibility for causing harm to 
 
 16. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74–271, § 202, 49 Stat. 620, 623 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. ch. 7 (2018)). 
 17. Social Security Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76–379, §§ 202(c)–(f), 53 Stat. 1364–66 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. ch. 7 (2018)). 
 18. Social Security Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84–880, § 223(c)(2) 70 Stat. 815, 815 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. ch. 7 (2018)) (defining “disability” for the purposes of determining 
who would be eligible for disability benefits as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by 
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or 
to be of long-continued and indefinite duration”). 
 19. See generally Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to Workmen’s Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 235 (1914). 
 20. See, e.g., Arthur A. Ballantine, A Compensation Plan for Railway Accident Claims, 29 HARV. L. REV. 
705, 708 (1916) (proposing an insurance system for handling accident claims that would be based on “liability 
irrespective of negligence” and “liability for a fixed reasonable sum for each injury or loss”). 
 21. See, e.g., Earnest M. Fisher, 42 U. CHI. J. POL. ECON. 130 (1934) (reviewing COMM. TO STUDY COMP. 
FOR AUTO. ACCIDENTS, REPORT TO THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES (1932)) (investigating the failure of the common law system to adequately compensate auto accident 
victims and calling for a system that would issue payments more quickly and reliably). 
 22. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 536, 366–466 (1958). 
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others in unreasonably dangerous ways would remain the basic guiding principle 
in tort cases. Courts might impose affirmative obligations on certain parties to 
take steps to prevent harm to others, but only in limited settings where the 
relationship between the parties had always implied that one party had 
undertaken a duty of care. For example, common carriers and innkeepers had 
long had common law duties to provide their customers a safe experience. After 
all, when people traveled away from home, they put their safety in the hands of 
those who provided them transportation and housing. All sides expected that 
customers could count on these providers to take reasonable steps to assure 
customers’ safety. 
And while then Judge Benjamin Cardozo had held in 1916 that 
manufacturers could be liable when their lack of due care with respect to their 
products caused physical harm to people other than their direct customers,23 this 
merely conformed product injury law to the otherwise broadly dominant 
principle of liability based on fault. Before Cardozo’s New York Court of 
Appeals opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. that year, it was commonly 
argued that only makers of products that by their very nature were dangerous, 
such as guns or certain drugs, had a general duty of due care that ran to those 
injured by the products. 
One justification for this was the view that it would be morally 
inappropriate to hold manufacturers liable for most products once they left 
manufacturers’ hands and were in the hands of buyers, whose product use 
manufacturers could not control.24 In his MacPherson opinion, Cardozo made 
clear how poorly this line had been drawn given the reality of modern product 
marketing.25 Were Buick to have its way, the only party to which Buick would 
owe a duty of care would be the Buick dealer, not the eventual car buyer, and 
the dealer was the least likely party to be injured by a carelessly made vehicle.26 
Still, I think that to call this decision the start of “enterprise liability” would be 
a mistake. The fact that a product caused its user harm was insufficient to impose 
liability on the maker; the victim had to demonstrate the maker’s carelessness as 
well, a basic principle the formalists surely could endorse. 
In 1963, the California Supreme Court finally adopted strict liability for 
defective products when Traynor delivered the court’s ruling in Greenman v. 
Yuba Power Products, Inc.27 The decision was issued just as Traynor’s colleague 
William Prosser, who had served as Dean of Berkeley Law, was shepherding the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts through the American Law Institute. Prosser 
 
 23. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916). 
 24. U.S. courts had derived a privity “rule” from the English case Winterbottom v. Wright, in which the 
court conjectured that allowing victims of defective products to recover from parties with whom they were not 
in privity of contract would lead to “the most absurd and outrageous consequences.” Winterbottom v. Wright 
(1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402. 
 25. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053. 
 26. Id. at 1055. 
 27. 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963). 
SUGARMAN-71.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/20  3:35 PM 
May 2020] JUSTICE ROGER J. TRAYNOR 981 
pushed the Institute to adopt the Traynor view of product liability, which it did.28 
It is hard to know in this chicken-and-egg situation which came first, rising 
acceptance of the Traynor view or the Restatement’s embrace of it, but in any 
event, the Traynor and Restatement position quickly swept the nation.29 
In this era, courts largely employed pragmatic reasoning in favor of 
victims’ claims. The concept of enterprise liability was clearly meant to widen 
tort law’s reach. In product injury cases and beyond, the California Supreme 
Court substantially broadened tort law in favor of plaintiffs in the period from 
Greenman in 1963 through the judicial retention election of 1986, when the 
public voted three very liberal justices off the California Supreme Court.30 
Importantly, significant funding for the campaign against them came from 
corporate defendants in tort cases that objected to how pro-plaintiff the court had 
become.31 
With three openings on the court, the Republican then-Governor George 
Deukmejian was able to appoint more conservative voices to its membership.32 
From 1986 until 2018, well into the second term of Governor Jerry Brown’s 
second round as Governor, the court was dominated by judges appointed by a 
series of Republican governors.33 
B. HOW THE MISGUIDED ROWLAND FACTORS PROMOTE THE TREATMENT OF 
“NO BREACH” CASES AS “NO DUTY” CASES 
Before turning to the more recent decisions, however, it is necessary to 
explain why I think our court has embraced a misguided use of conventional tort 
law language in its opinions. I blame this on the so-called “Rowland factors,” 
which the court routinely cites and which I believe are decidedly wrong-
headed.34 
Cases that rest on claims of defendant negligence require the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that the defendant owed her a duty of due care, that she breached 
that duty, that the breach caused the plaintiff’s injury, and that the injury was 
fairly within the scope of the risk that the defendant unreasonably took (this 
latter traditionally known as the “proximate cause” requirement). It is well 
 
 28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 29. The evolution of product liability following its appearance in the 1965 Restatement culminated in the 
American Law Institute’s publication of a products-liability-specific Restatement. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
 30. John H. Culver, The Transformation of the California Supreme Court: 1977–1997, 61 ALB. L. REV. 
1461, 1466 (1998). Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth Bird and Associate Justices Joseph R. Grodin and Cruz Reynoso 
had been appointed by Democratic Governor Jerry Brown during his first eight-year stint in office. Id. at 1466. 
The political campaign to remove them focused on their records of voting to overturn death sentences and 
depicted them as blocking the implementation of the death penalty. Id. at 1465. A “tough on crime” mentality 
on the part of voters swept them out of office. See id.  
 31. For an account of the evolution of public sentiment toward the Bird Court, see PREBLE STOLZ, JUDGING 
JUDGES: THE INVESTIGATION OF ROSE BIRD AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT (1981). 
 32. Culver, supra note 30, at 1466.  
 33. See id. at 1480–85. 
 34. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).  
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accepted that whether or not a duty of due care is owed is a legal question for 
the court, but that the other issues are normally for the fact finder—usually a 
jury, in tort cases. However, it is also well accepted that the trial judge, if asked, 
has an obligation to decide what otherwise would be a jury question if the judge 
fairly concludes that no jury could reasonably find other than one way. 
These requests are almost all made by defendants, typically through 
motions for a summary judgment or a directed verdict. Viewing the evidence 
most favorably to the plaintiff, judges can and should decide for defendants as a 
matter of law if the only reasonable conclusion is that the plaintiff failed to show 
a lack of due care on the part of the defendant; that the plaintiff failed to show a 
causal connection between the defendant’s act and the victim’s harm; or that the 
victim’s injury was decidedly outside the scope of the risk the plaintiff claimed 
(or showed) the defendant to have unreasonably taken. 
On appeal, the classic issues in negligence cases are these: First, should the 
trial court have dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint at the outset (in response to 
the defendant’s motion) because the defendant did not actually owe the plaintiff 
a duty to exercise due care to protect her from harm in this setting? Second, 
should the trial judge have granted the requested summary judgment and/or 
directed verdict motion because of the self-evidently one-sided nature of the 
evidence, notwithstanding the fact that the jury decided otherwise, in favor of 
the plaintiff?35  
If the case centers on a product liability claim, then one can substitute 
“product defect” for “due care,” and the same structure applies. 
The most important takeaway from this basic outline of tort law is that 
when there is “no duty,” the defendant is not required to exercise due care. Put 
differently, so far as tort law is concerned, it is acceptable for the defendant to 
act in a way that a jury could find to have been unreasonably dangerous. Most 
of the time, there is a duty to exercise due care in carrying out one’s affairs, but 
sometimes, and for arguably good reasons, there is no such duty in tort. These 
are occasions that the judges, and most importantly the highest court judges, are 
responsible for identifying. 
My problem with how our court is going about its business is that it is 
making “no duty” decisions based on the wrong criteria. Moreover, it is all too 
often issuing “no duty” determinations that are better understood as 
determinations that there was no breach as a matter of law. 
One further complicating matter needs attention before I explain how the 
court got on the wrong path. As I have already pointed out, whether the 
defendant exercised “due care” is normally a jury question. The fallback 
instruction meant to help jurors answer that question is to tell them to decide 
what a reasonable person would have done in the circumstances and then to 
determine whether the defendant conformed to that behavior. This gives juries 
 
 35. Sometimes, the trial judge does rule that there was no duty and it is the plaintiff who appeals; other 
times, the trial judge does grant the defendant’s summary judgment/directed verdict motion and it is the plaintiff 
who appeals, saying the issue should have gone to the jury. 
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considerable discretion to figure out how they believe reasonable people in their 
community would act in the circumstances before them. Of course, juries can be 
influenced by the evidence either side brings to the matter, including evidence 
as to what is customary practice, for example. Yet, evidence that is persuasive 
may not be conclusive, as when a jury concludes that industry practice is simply 
too dangerous to be considered reasonable in the circumstances. 
However, tort doctrine also provides that in certain circumstances, high 
courts may embrace “rules” of conduct that override the more amorphous due 
care “standard.”36 Rules have advantages: they more precisely let defendants 
know what is expected of them, and they can make resolving cases easier and 
more consistent. But they have disadvantages as well: they can become quickly 
outmoded from a social as well as a technological standpoint, no longer 
reflecting community consensus as to what constitutes sufficient care. Also, the 
specificity of rules may mean they work fine for some fact patterns but then 
seem wrongheaded for new circumstances or ones that were not anticipated 
when the rules were announced. 
In principle, high courts should take these competing considerations into 
account when deciding whether or not to adopt a rule. A central doctrinal point, 
however, is that these sorts of rules are specifications as to what is and is not a 
breach of the duty of due care. Hence, when a court decides to hold in favor of 
the defendant because the precaution sought by the plaintiff is not required by a 
rule, it is wrong, or at least misleading, to say that the defendant had “no duty” 
to take the asked-for precaution (even if this is a natural use of the English 
language). It is better to say there was “no breach as a matter of law.” 
The court has especially fumbled this distinction when applying the so-
called Rowland factors.37 These factors have their origins in the 1958 case 
Biakanja v. Irving,38 in which the California Supreme Court set out 
considerations for determining when a duty is owed.39 In Biakanja, the 
defendant notary public had prepared a will but failed to have it properly 
witnessed, leading to financial loss to the decedent’s sister when the will was 
denied probate.40 The principal question was whether someone other than a 
professional’s client may sue the professional for negligent professional conduct 
that caused the plaintiff economic harm.41 The Biakanja court cited six factors 
relevant to determining liability, most of which were affirmed and expanded in 
Rowland v. Christian in 1968.42 
The Rowland factors now dominate the court’s determinations of when to 
impose liability in tort cases. Rowland was an extremely important decision, as 
it threw out the complex set of rules that once governed tort claims when people 
 
 36. See the discussion in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 123–24 (1881). 
 37. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968). 
 38. 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958). 
 39. Id. at 18. 
 40. Id. at 17. 
 41. Id. at 18. 
 42. Id. at 19; see also Rowland, 443 P.2d at 567.  
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were injured on the premises of others. These included separate rules for 
invitees, licensees, and trespassers, with sub-rules for child trespassers, 
discovered trespassers, and so on. In Rowland, the court concluded that from 
then on, cases involving plaintiffs injured on others’ premises would all be 
decided under the basic “due care” standard.43 I have no objection to this 
conclusion, and the Restatement (Third) has since embraced this outcome as 
well (with an exception for cases involving “flagrant” trespassers).44 Indeed, 
Rowland itself was not really a case about duty, but rather a case about how to 
determine whether or not there has been a breach of duty. Nonetheless, the court 
went out of its way to set out duty/no duty considerations. 
My problem is with the Rowland factors. According to Professor Ursin, 
when the court announced these factors, it drew not only on Biakanja but also 
on Dean Prosser’s famous torts treatise,45 the Harper and James treatise,46 and 
earlier writing of Dean Leon Green.47 The court has relentlessly referred to the 
Rowland factors in subsequent decisions.48 It may seem presumptuous to 
complain about a set of considerations with such an esteemed pedigree, but the 
Rowland factors are nonetheless misguided: only some of them are properly 
relevant to deciding whether a legal duty is owed, at the same time as the list 
omits factors that are properly relevant to this determination. 
Let us start with the factors that are most clearly out of place. The first is 
“the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff,” and the second is “the extent of the 
burden to the defendant . . . of imposing a duty to exercise care.”49 These 
considerations go not to duty, but to whether there was a breach of due care in 
the specific case before the court—considerations that normally are for the fact 
finder to determine. It is well recognized that consideration of whether a 
defendant was negligent or not should include consideration of the extent of the 
risk she took (the foreseeability question) and how difficult it would have been 
for her to take the plaintiff’s proposed precaution to prevent the injury (the 
burden question).50 Of course, as already noted, the risk could be so small (that 
is, unforeseeable or only minimally foreseeable) or the burden of precaution so 
 
 43. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 567. 
 44. 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 52 (AM. LAW INST. 
2012); Stephen D. Sugarman, Land-Possessor Liability in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Too Much and Too 
Little, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1079, 1082–86 (2009). 
 45. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971). 
 46. FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS (1956). 
 47. Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1928); Leon Green, 
The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255 (1929). 
 48. E.g., T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18, 28 (Cal. 2017); Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 
283, 290 (Cal. 2016); Verdugo v. Target Corp., 327 P.3d 774, 790 (Cal. 2014); Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 
248 P.3d 1170, 1174 (Cal. 2011).  
 49. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968). 
 50. The Restatement (Third) states that conduct is negligent if the “magnitude of the risk” triggered by the 
conduct, which hinges on both “the foreseeable likelihood of harm and the foreseeable severity of harm that 
might ensue,” outweighs the burden imposed by prevention of the risk. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3(e) (AM. LAW INST. 2005). 
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great that no jury could reasonably find a breach of the due care standard. If so, 
provided that the proper motions have been brought, the trial judge (or appellate 
court, if necessary) can and should rule that there has been no breach as a matter 
of law. But this is not the same as a ruling that the defendant owed no duty of 
care to the plaintiff at all and could act unreasonably without fear of tort liability. 
A third Rowland factor is “the closeness of the connection between the 
defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered,” 51 and this does not properly go to 
the duty issue, either. Rather, it is just a straightforward way of expressing the 
“scope of the risk” (or “proximate cause”) question. A court may find that the 
harm suffered by a plaintiff is outside the scope of the risk posed by the 
defendant’s negligence when only one result is plausible, but again, this finding 
does not mean that the defendant had owed no duty at all to the victim.  
A fourth Rowland factor is “the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury.”52 The normal remedy in tort cases is the award of money 
damages to compensate for the injury. The extent of the harm suffered by the 
plaintiff is also a question for the fact finder, and if the plaintiff was not in fact 
injured, no compensatory damages should be awarded. The question of how 
much harm a specific plaintiff suffered thus also fails to go to the duty issue. 
The fifth and sixth Rowland factors are, in my view, of limited value on 
the duty question. They are “the moral blame attached to the defendant’s 
conduct” and “the policy of preventing future harm.” 53 These are two key values 
that underlie negligence law in general. For the formalists especially, if the 
defendant’s conduct was blameworthy, it makes sense to make her take financial 
responsibility for the harm she caused. For the pragmatists especially, the threat 
of tort liability is centrally justified on the grounds that it encourages people to 
act with due care. Hence, assuming the plaintiff alleges and can then prove the 
failure to exercise due care, these factors on their own always point in the 
direction of imposing a duty of due care. But none of the six factors discussed 
so far go to the crucial question of when it is okay, as far as tort law is concerned, 
for defendants to fail to exercise due care—that is, the duty question. 
Two Rowland factors remain. The seventh is “the availability, cost, and 
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” 54 Notice how this factor does not 
go to the facts of the specific case but instead to an unspecified broader class of 
injuries encompassing the injury at issue. To the extent that the spreading of 
losses via tort law is seen as relevant to the imposition of tort liability, this factor 
should matter. It seems to me to be an especially pragmatic concern. From the 
second half of the twentieth century to the present, there has been a robust market 
in liability insurance for purchase by enterprises and individuals (the latter via 
auto insurance and homeowner/renter insurance, and perhaps supplemented by 
“umbrella” policies that provide additional insurance coverage if the basic policy 
 
 51. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 567. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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limits are insufficient). By pointing to insurance as a relevant factor, the court is 
signaling the appropriateness of imposing a duty in tort (since a would-be injurer 
can protect herself in advance via insurance). This factor also indicates the 
practical reality of tort litigation, in which cases are rarely brought absent a 
sufficiently deep pocket that is typically not the defendant’s but the defendant’s 
liability insurer, even when the defendant is an enterprise. 
Notice that this factor does not go to whether a specific defendant has 
insurance. It has long been the rule that this fact and the fact of how much 
insurance a defendant has are not to be disclosed to the jury.55 But again, in the 
overwhelming majority of tort claims that are tried or settled for anything but a 
trivial sum, the payer is the insurer and the victim’s lawyer is well aware of that 
(and probably should make sure early on that the client is, as well). 
There may be instances in which there is no insurance or no adequate 
insurance. This could happen, for example, where the defendant has harmed so 
many people that to compensate all of them would create “crushing” liability 
that goes beyond practical insurance coverage. One solution to this state of 
affairs is to combine the claims in some way and allow the victims to share in 
whatever recovery is possible (such as, up to the policy limit and including any 
substantial additional assets that an enterprise defendant might have). 
But, on occasion, courts have decided that to financially crush certain 
defendants would be counterproductive. In these circumstances, courts have 
held that there is no duty at all, or at least no duty to the class of plaintiffs before 
them. For example, in the 1985 case Strauss v. Belle Realty Co. before the Court 
of Appeals of New York, the plaintiff had fallen and been injured during a 
blackout caused by Consolidated Edison’s gross negligence (as established in an 
earlier case) but was not a Consolidated Edison customer.56 As the blackout had 
ostensibly affected millions of noncustomers, the court sought “to limit the legal 
consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree” by holding that the power 
company did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff.57 And in H. R. Moch Co. v. 
Rensselaer Water Co. in 1928, the same court held that a company contracted to 
supply water to a city’s fire hydrants was not liable for harm to city residents 
caused by the company’s alleged negligent failure to furnish an adequate supply 
of water.58 Justice Cardozo observed that finding such a duty would “unduly and 
indeed indefinitely extend” liability.59 
In my view, the reasoning that finding a duty is counterproductive when it 
would create “crushing” liability is better understood as an example of the eighth 
and final Rowland factor: “the burden . . . to the community of imposing duty to 
exercise care.” Here, finally, we get to what I believe is a factor that truly goes 
 
 55. See MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 479 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972); 
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1155 (West 2020). 
 56. Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 35 (N.Y. 1985). 
 57. Id. at 36 (citing Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969)). 
 58. H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898–99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 59. Id. at 899. 
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to the question of duty. Put more simply or more broadly, the question is whether 
having tort liability in cases like the one at issue will do more harm than good. 
The good in question is the usual supposed good of tort law: compensation for 
those harmed by the negligence of others and perhaps deterrence of future 
similar negligent conduct. But when the society-wide consequences of imposing 
liability would be unacceptable, public policy might call for denying recovery 
in tort. 
When might this happen? It might if allowing recovery would destroy a 
vital public utility or prevent existing public utilities from entering into new 
forms of production that are socially desirable. Or it might occur in the context 
of pharmaceutical drugs or vaccines, where allowing recovery by injured 
patients might stymie needed medical advancement. Imposing liability in other 
contexts might prompt people to give up important liberties, such as the freedom 
to work where and for whom they wish, exercise their free speech rights, or 
maintain their autonomy by not coming to the aid of strangers with whom they 
do not want to become involved. 
It should be added here that potential defendants might change their 
conduct in socially undesirable ways not only out of fear of tort liability when 
they are carelessly causing harm (which one would think they could often avoid 
by being careful), but also out of fear that they will be found to have been at 
fault when they were not. A no-duty decision precludes both possibilities. 
This balancing of the benefits of tort recovery for the category of victims 
at stake against the broader social costs of imposing the sort of liability at issue 
is, in my view, properly done by higher courts. Unlike juries, they are not 
supposed to be focused on the facts of the specific injury in a case. They are 
deciding the matter at what I call the “wholesale” level, leaving juries to make 
decisions (when a duty exists) at the “retail” level. 
This is not the only justification for a no-duty ruling in tort, but it is an 
extremely important one and one that features in many of the court’s decisions 
over the past thirty-plus years. In prior writings, I have identified several 
possible justifications for a no-duty decision,60 and I have subdivided the one 
just raised into two ideas. First, a duty in tort could be precluded because tort 
law is properly trumped by an important social value. The lack of an obligation 
in tort to help a stranger in need, even if the rescue were easy, might be justified 
on the grounds that the imposition on personal liberty would be too great.61 Or 
in cases where copycat criminals impose harm by engaging in the same nasty 
conduct they saw on TV or at the movies the night before, the lack of a tort duty 
on the part of the broadcaster/director may be justified on the grounds that to 
impose one would too much inhibit the exercise of artistic freedom and free 
 
 60. Stephen D. Sugarman, Rethinking Tort Doctrine: Visions of a Restatement (Fourth) of Torts, 50 UCLA 
L. REV. 585, 613–618 (2002); Stephen D. Sugarman, Why No Duty, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 669, 671–94 (2012) 
[hereinafter Sugarman, Why No Duty?]. 
 61. See 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 37–44 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2012). 
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speech in general.62 Notice that a good reason for judges to make these decisions 
is that they can look beyond the specific case before them and out over society 
at large. Juries, by contrast, may well ignore the wider perspective and simply 
conclude that it was unreasonable in this instance not to make the simple gesture 
that would have rescued the victim, or that it was unreasonable in that instance 
to portray a graphic attack in a particular movie. 
Second, courts need to be concerned about the possibility of what I call 
perverse social responses to the imposition of tort liability. When looking at a 
given case in isolation, it might seem sensible to conclude that the defendant 
failed to exercise due care, but what if one is confident that the wider impact of 
imposing liability in the case would cause people (and enterprises) to act (or fail 
to act) in ways that are decidedly socially undesirable? We would prefer if 
people did not react to a threat of tort liability in that way, but if they did, then 
it might be sensible to sacrifice the interests of one victim to the interests of the 
broader community. The crushing liability example involving a negligent power 
company is perhaps one good example of this: better for the victim to lose his 
case than for Consolidated Edison to go out of business and leave the community 
without essential public services. Congress acted on similar grounds when it 
limited the potential tort liability of nuclear power plant operators in the face of 
the nuclear industry’s unwillingness to pursue new technology without 
protection against potential crushing liability.63 
I have previously described further contexts in which findings of no duty 
in tort are justified. One is where the determination that the victim’s remedy lies 
elsewhere than in tort.64 For example, employees injured on the job in the United 
States have no ability to sue their employer for negligence; instead, their remedy 
is in workers’ compensation. Second, perhaps spouses complaining of serious 
emotional abuse by the other spouse should have their remedy in family law, not 
tort law, thereby preventing many divorces from becoming tort cases as well.65 
Third, the so-called “economic loss rule” generally provides that if a party with 
whom you are in a contractual relationship negligently causes you financial 
harm, your remedy is in contract law, not tort law.66 Fourth, professional athletes 
who are unionized and have access to disability insurance are perhaps justifiably 
denied tort remedies against fellow athletes for on-field/on-court injuries on the 
grounds that their remedies lie elsewhere and that leagues and officials, not 
juries, should govern conduct during play.67 
 
 62. See Olivia N. v. NBC, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 892 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (describing as “obvious” the 
“chilling effect of permitting negligence actions for a television broadcast” alleged to have inspired violence). 
 63. See Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (2018). 
 64. Sugarman, Why No Duty?, supra note 60, at 671. 
 65. See Ira Mark Ellman & Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional Abuse as a Tort, 55 MD. L. REV. 
1268, 1272 (1996). 
 66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 
2012). An exception applies to malpractice by professionals such as lawyers and accountants, and tort remedies 
may be available for intentional misconduct via claim for fraud. Id. at §§ 4, 17(b), 17 cmt. b. 
 67. See, e.g., Karas v. Strevell, 884 N.E.2d 122, 137 (Ill. 2008). 
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Another justification for no-duty findings is that courts justifiably fear an 
avalanche of small claims that would swamp the judicial system and crowd out 
more seriously injured victims if duty were too frequently imposed. This perhaps 
justifies rules that require a showing of more than the negligent imposition of 
minor emotional harm (even though there is no such threshold for physical harm 
claims).68 In a related vein, some disputes may be ones that courts conclude they 
(and juries) are ill-equipped to decide sensibly and consistently.69  
What I emphasize here is that there indeed are possibly convincing 
arguments that would free classes of otherwise suable defendants from 
obligations in tort. These are all, in one way or another, pragmatic policy 
arguments favoring findings of no duty. In all of these settings, so far as tort law 
is concerned, it is okay to be at fault and cause the victim harm. Jurors might 
find the defendant liable if left to decide a specific case in any of these settings. 
But when one or more overriding factors convinces the higher court that 
allowing tort liability in given circumstances would be unwise, the court will not 
allow a jury to decide whether to impose liability. It is these considerations, not 
the Rowland factors, that capture what it means for there to be “no duty” in tort. 
With this prelude out of the way, I turn now to the decisions of the 
California Supreme Court in personal injury and death cases over the past twenty 
years. 
II.  IN RECENT CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE, PRAGMATISM 
REIGNS 
In reviewing the California Supreme Court’s torts decisions over the past 
two decades, I have identified two dozen reasonably important cases involving 
personal injury and/or death. In this Part, I show that the court routinely takes 
social policy considerations into account in coming to its conclusions. In terms 
of Professor Ursin’s dichotomy, the justices are basically all pragmatists now in 
resolving torts disputes. 
However, this does not mean that the court’s pragmatism has led it to 
expand tort liability in order to provide wider compensation to victims of the 
accidents of the modern age, as Traynor or James’s brand of pragmatism 
encouraged. To the contrary, the court continually repeats its view that it is not 
tort law’s job to provide insurance to victims. Yet it would be wrong to say that 
the court is simply pro-business, always seeking to protect enterprises from 
liability. Plaintiffs were successful, after all, in more than a third of the decisions 
that I reviewed.  
 
 68. 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 (AM. LAW INST. 
2012). 
 69. For instance, decisions by courts in most states finding no duty of ordinary due care among sports 
participants are often justified (at least in part) on the grounds that courts and juries are unable to properly assess 
whether a given injury was produced by negligence or simply by “ordinary” play. See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 
834 P.2d 696, 710 (Cal. 1992). 
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A perhaps surprisingly large share of the cases under review involve people 
injured on the premises of others, hoping to hold those in charge of the premises 
responsible for these harms. The court remains firmly committed to the fault 
principle in these cases. In a wide variety of settings, it tries to determine whether 
the defendant should properly be held liable (or at least whether a jury should 
make that decision), or, alternately, whether the plaintiff’s case should be flat-
out rejected. The results are mixed, which is understandable given the mixture 
of facts before the court in these disputes.  
As I will show, the court unfortunately continues to hand down what it calls 
“no duty” decisions that are better understood as findings of “no breach.” 
Regardless, throughout these cases the court calls attention to the potential social 
consequences of holding defendants liable—very pragmatic concerns. 
However, the court seems to conflate two different ways of addressing 
these potential consequences. On the one hand, if the precaution that the plaintiff 
says the defendant should have taken would clearly have been unreasonably 
burdensome given the facts of the case, this goes to show that there has been no 
breach of the due care standard as a matter of law, because no jury could 
reasonably find that this defendant should have acted in the way the plaintiff 
proposes. On the other hand, if the jury might reasonably find that a defendant 
should have taken the identified precaution (and hence bring in a verdict for the 
plaintiff), but the court pragmatically realizes that imposing liability would 
cause perverse social responses that would be much worse for the community 
than denying liability in the specific instance, this can justify a no-duty 
conclusion. Put differently, in the no-breach cases, liability would ostensibly 
impose too great a burden on the individual defendant, while in the no-duty 
cases, it would impose too great a burden on the community. In either category 
of case, note well how pragmatism can lead to defendant victories, in contrast 
with how Traynor and James viewed pragmatic concerns as arguments for wider 
liability. 
Many others of the cases I highlight involve product injuries, where the 
real question before the court is often which of multiple potential parties should 
take responsibility for a product’s harmful consequences. Pragmatic 
considerations play a large role in resolving that question. (Some of the non-
product-injury cases also involve this sort of choice among potential loss 
spreaders and loss preventers.) 
Surprisingly to me, there are few motor vehicle cases in the group under 
review. In only one was the defendant another motor vehicle operator (or more 
specifically, the employer of the other motor vehicle operator).70 Otherwise, the 
victim was seeking to have someone else take responsibility for the injury, even 
though a third-party vehicle operator was at fault. This reflects the practical 
reality that motorists often have no or insufficient liability insurance, meaning 
 
 70. Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 248 P.3d 1170, 1172 (Cal. 2011). 
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that victims of third-party vehicle operators’ negligence frequently need to find 
an additional party to blame. 
A. CASES IN WHICH THE COURT PREDICTED PERVERSE SOCIAL RESPONSES 
AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR REJECTING TORT LIABILITY 
In a substantial number of cases, the court predicted that imposing liability 
on the defendant would lead to social consequences that were so undesirable, 
they justified findings of no liability. These are no-duty justifications. For 
example, in Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church, the plaintiff was injured when 
crossing a public road between his church’s parking annex and the church itself 
and sought to hold the church liable.71 The court predicted that imposing liability 
in such a setting would cause organizations like churches to give up providing 
any parking at all, to the serious detriment of parishioners and others.72 
In Verdugo v. Target Corp., a woman had a heart attack in a Target store 
and died.73 Her family brought a wrongful death action, claiming that Target 
should have had a defibrillator on hand with personnel trained to use it in 
situations such as this where the victim faced the risk of death before emergency 
medical technicians arrived.74 The court predicted that allowing a jury to find 
Target liable for failing to provide this precaution would force business 
establishments in general to similarly provide defibrillators, which it viewed as 
clearly unwarranted. 75 
In both Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. and O’Neil v. Crane Co., the 
issue before the court was whether an adequate warning about a product’s danger 
had been provided.76 In Johnson, the court applied the “sophisticated user 
defense” to conclude that the plaintiff should have known of the danger even 
without a warning.77 And in O’Neil, the court concluded that the defendant’s 
well-made products (valves and pipes) were simply not sufficiently involved in 
causing the plaintiff’s asbestos-related disease for the court to fairly hold the 
defendant responsible for the harm.78 In both cases, the court also expressed the 
more sweeping policy concern that requiring additional warnings in cases like 
these would ultimately be detrimental to consumers overall, because the 
resulting overabundance of warnings would “invite mass consumer disregard 
and ultimate contempt for the warning process.”79 
In Gregory v. Cott, a specially trained home-helper was cut by a knife 
during a struggle with a violent Alzheimer’s patient and sued the patient and her 
 
 71. Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church, 404 P.3d 1196, 1198 (Cal. 2017). 
 72. See id. at 1208. 
 73. Verdugo v. Target Corp., 327 P.3d 774, 776 (Cal. 2014). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 793–94. 
 76. Johnson v. Am. Standard, Inc., 179 P.3d 905, 909 (Cal. 2008); O’Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987, 991 
(Cal. 2012). 
 77. Johnson, 179 P.3d at 916–17. 
 78. O’Neil, 266 P.3d at 996. 
 79. Johnson, 179 P.3d at 914 (citing Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 677 P.2d 1147, 1153 (Cal. 1984)). 
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husband, who had sought to keep his wife at home and reasonably safe rather 
than place her in an institution.80 Finding against the victim, the court predicted 
that imposing liability in cases like this would discourage people from hiring 
this sort of in-home help and instead cause people to institutionalize their loved 
ones, a socially undesirable result. 81 The court employed similar logic in Priebe 
v. Nelson, where the defendant’s dog bit an employee at the kennel where the 
dog was being boarded.82 The court concluded that, even in the face of a strict 
liability dog bite statute,83 dog owners would not be liable to this class of victims 
(assuming the owners did not fail to disclose any known dangerous tendencies 
of their dogs). The court reasoned that imposing liability in this case would cause 
people to avoid using kennels to the widespread detriment of the world of pets 
and pet care. 84 
I emphasize three things about these examples. First, the court clearly takes 
pragmatic considerations into account when arguing against tort liability. 
Second, the court’s predictions of the perverse social responses that would result 
from imposing liability may be backed by plausible hunches, but not the sort of 
empirical evidence on which an administrative agency and perhaps a legislature 
would likely rely in deciding what precautions should be required. And third, I 
am frankly skeptical about the reliability of all of these predictions. It is perhaps 
ironic that this last point shows that the formalists may have been onto 
something important in their opposition to importing these sorts of policy 
considerations into common law decision-making. 
At the same time, by denying recovery in these settings, the court is 
effectively pointing consumers to the legislative or administrative process if they 
want to see the sorts of precautions plaintiffs are asking for put in place. Indeed, 
the court was quite explicit about this in Verdugo, where it emphasized that the 
legislature at the time required only health-club-type facilities to have 
defibrillators and that it was up to legislators to decide if any other facilities 
would be obligated to do so.85 But this decision precluded jurors from making 
the sort of decision they have been making for decades, that is, what level of 
care should reasonably have been provided in a given setting. Specifically, a jury 
deciding this case would have had to focus on the costs and benefits of Target 
making available in-store a product it already sold online.  
In my view, the court went off track in treating Verdugo as involving the 
tort duty question, which it clearly did not. At stake in the case was whether or 
not there had been a breach of the duty of due care clearly owed to a customer 
taken ill on the enterprise’s premises.86 And while a court may in appropriate 
 
 80. Gregory v. Cott, 331 P.3d 179, 181–82 (Cal. 2014). 
 81. Id. at 191. 
 82. Priebe v. Nelson, 140 P.3d 848, 850 (Cal. 2006). 
 83. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3342(a) (West 2020). 
 84. Priebe, 140 P.3d at 865–66. 
 85. Verdugo v. Target Corp., 327 P.3d 774, 793–94 (Cal. 2014). 
 86. Stephen D. Sugarman, Misusing the “No Duty” Doctrine in Tort Decisions: Following the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts Would Yield Better Decisions, 53 ALTA. L. REV. 913, 914 (2016). 
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circumstances find that there was no breach of that duty as a matter of law, the 
conventional way of disposing of this sort of case is to allow a plaintiff to at least 
put forward her evidence about how many lives defibrillators would save if 
placed in stores like the defendant’s and what the cost of installing the devices 
and training employees to use them would be. Perhaps the evidence supporting 
a requirement that big-box stores like Target have defibrillators would be so 
weak as to eventually justify a directed verdict for the defendant, but since, for 
example, it could be shown that Target had (under a legal requirement) put such 
devices in its stores in Oregon, it seems to me that the matter might well have 
been left for a jury to resolve.  
The court approached Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. in a 
similar vein, treating the case as though the defendant owed no duty when what 
the court was really deciding is that there was no breach.87 In Wiener, someone 
deliberately drove his car through a chain-link fence around a childcare center, 
killing two children and injuring others.88 The defendant in the lawsuit was the 
childcare center.89 To justify its conclusion that the center owed the children no 
duty, the court stressed that the criminal act was unforeseeable.90 To me, the 
unforeseeability of the harm does not support a finding of no duty, but rather a 
finding that as a matter of law, there was no breach of the duty of due care the 
center clearly owed to the children. 
There are other cases where the confusion between the duty issue and the 
breach issue leaves one wondering just what the court was deciding. In 
Castaneda v. Olsher, for example, the defendant’s tenant was injured by a stray 
bullet on the defendant’s property during a fight between gang members, one of 
whom was another resident of the property.91 The victim claimed that the 
defendant was at fault in renting to gang members, but the court held for the 
landlord, asserting that he “did not have a duty to refuse to rent to applicants his 
manager thought were gang members.”92 On the one hand, the court’s opinion 
sounds as though it was saying there was no breach (even if the court used the 
“no duty” phrasing), pointing out that there was no special evidence to suggest 
that these gang-member tenants were a risk to other tenants 93 The court 
emphasized that the harm was unforeseeable, and foreseeability goes to the 
question of whether there was a breach.94 At the same time, the court predicted 
that finding liability here would put landlords generally in the untenable position 
of either engaging in arbitrary housing discrimination (against prospective 
 
 87. Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Ctrs., Inc., 88 P.3d 517, 525 (Cal. 2004). 
 88. Id. at 520.  
 89. Id. at 519. 
 90. Id.at 525 (“[T]he foreseeability of a perpetrator’s committing premeditated murder against the children 
was impossible to anticipate . . . . Without prior similar criminal acts . . . defendants here could not have been 
expected to create a fortress to protect the children.”). 
 91. Castaneda v. Olsher, 162 P.3d 610, 613–14 (Cal. 2007). 
 92. Id. at 621. 
 93. See id.  
 94. Id. at 621–22. 
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tenants who were potential gang members) or being held liable for something 
they could not have reasonably prevented.95 This second line of argument is a 
pragmatic one that points to finding no duty. The court’s analysis in Castaneda 
shows that its predictions of perverse social responses flowing from tort liability 
were not necessary for it to find for the defendant in all—or even any—of the 
cases under review where it did. It could have justified its findings of no liability 
solely on the grounds that the burdens on the defendants before it would have 
been too great. 
Perhaps arguments about perverse social responses are at least sometimes 
a makeweight, a possibly inappropriate piling-on of arguments in favor of a 
position that is otherwise sufficiently justified. For example, in Gregory, the 
knife-grabbing Alzheimer’s patient case, and in Priebe, the dog bite case, the 
court pragmatically concluded that, as compared with the defendants who were 
sued, the employers of these two victims were much better suited to take the 
appropriate precautions to help their employees avoid injury.96 This taken alone 
could justify the no-duty decisions in those cases, without resort to speculative 
predictions about how the public might undesirably respond were the case 
decided differently. 
Two cases from the group I identified involved recreational injuries. In 
Shin v. Ahn, one golfer sued another for failing to shout “fore” before swinging 
when the errant ball had then struck the victim.97 The court invoked its 
previously announced policy with respect to lawsuits among participants in 
recreational activities, to wit, that there would be no tort liability for ordinary 
negligence.98 The core justification for this no-duty ruling was the court’s 
prediction that exposure to liability in such settings would prompt residents to 
forego athletic engagement (and, presumably, stay at home in front of their TVs 
and become unhealthy).99 Shin reiterated the pragmatic nature of the court’s 
concerns and its willingness to sacrifice individual victims of wrongdoing to the 
promotion of broader social objectives. Once more, I am quite skeptical about 
the validity of this genre of judicial prediction. After all, there is no indication 
that residents of Wisconsin, for example, quit engaging in recreational pursuits 
for fear of tort liability due to the application of ordinary fault principles to such 
activity.100 To be sure, the plaintiff in Shin might well have had a difficult time 
 
 95. Id. at 616. 
 96. Gregory v. Cott, 331 P.3d 179, 181–82 (Cal. 2014); see also Priebe v. Nelson, 140 P.3d 848, 865–66 
(Cal. 2006). 
 97. Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 583 (Cal. 2007). 
 98. Id. at 586–87 (citing Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992)). 
 99. Id. at 587. 
 100. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 1993 Lestina decision applied a negligence standard to recreational 
soccer participants’ conduct. Lestina v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 28, 33 (Wis. 1993). Wisconsin’s 
legislature then narrowed the application of ordinary negligence law to lawsuits among those engaged in 
recreational activities by requiring the plaintiff to prove “reckless[]” or “intent[ional]” wrongdoing in settings 
where there is physical contact between persons in an organized sport involving amateur teams. WIS. 
STAT. § 895.525 (4m)(a) (2019). But cases with facts like those in Shin and Knight appear to be still governed 
by regular fault principles. 
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proving that a cry of “fore” would actually have made a difference and allowed 
him to avoid the injury, but that is not the basis on which the case was decided.  
In Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P., the plaintiff was harmed by the collision of 
the bumper car in which she was riding in the defendant’s amusement park.101 
Whatever the persuasiveness of the no-duty rule for participants in recreational 
activities, it hardly applies when the defendant is not another participant, but the 
enterprise providing the fun.102 The court dispensed with the victim’s claim here 
by invoking the “assumption of risk” doctrine, always an unhelpful line of 
argument that obscures whatever element of negligence law is truly at issue.103 
Based on what the court seemingly argued, Nalwa is best seen as a no-breach 
decision. The plaintiff was clearly aware of the risk, and there was no reasonable 
precaution that the defendant should have taken to reduce that risk.104 To be sure, 
the bumper car ride could have been altered so that the cars moved around only 
at extremely slow speeds to make their bumps exceedingly low in impact, but 
this would have destroyed the enjoyment of the experience.105 And indeed, the 
plaintiff offered no real practical solution to maintain the viability of the 
amusement ride while reducing its danger (which was rather small, in any 
event).106 
This case is very reminiscent of a famous 1929 decision by then Chief 
Judge Cardozo concerning the “Flopper,” an amusement park ride featuring a 
narrow moving walkway on which participants would sit or stand until they were 
thrown off balance onto padded side walls.107 While serious injuries rarely 
resulted, one unlucky victim fractured his kneecap on the ride and sought to hold 
the amusement park liable.108 The Court of Appeal threw his case out, confident 
that the Flopper was a socially enjoyable ride it did not want to condemn and 
that the victim had been clearly warned of the possible danger.109 Hence, there 
was no breach of the amusement park’s duty of due care towards its 
customers.110 That Cardozo tossed in the phrase “volenti non fit injuria”111 was 
unnecessary and only confusing. Adding what is in effect the assumption of risk 
defense to his analysis did not clarify it. Plainly, some people who consent to or 
assume risks are not always barred from recovery in tort. For example, imagine 
that your doctor tells you she will try to operate on you carefully but that there 
is always the risk she might commit medical malpractice. If you tell her to go 
ahead and operate and she does, in fact, commit malpractice, you can still sue 
 
 101. Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 290 P.3d 1158, 1160 (Cal. 2012). 
 102. See id. 
 103. Id. at 1167.  
 104. Id. at 1164. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id.  
 107. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 173–74 (N.Y. 1929). 
 108. Id. at 174. 
 109. Id. at 174–75 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 174. The expression may be translated as, “To one who is willing, no harm is done.” 
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her for it, even though you assumed the physical risk of your injury. Or if I warn 
you that the crosswalk you are about to use to go to the other side of the street 
has been the site of several auto accidents and you cross anyway and are struck 
by a careless motorist, your tort claim against the motorist is still valid—even 
though you assumed the physical risk. 
So, when does assuming the physical risk result in no liability? One setting 
is where there was no way to reasonably prevent an accident you were warned 
about or, in other words, there was no breach of the duty of due care. That fairly 
describes the Flopper case, where asking the defendant to eliminate the ride, 
slow it down, or widen its walkway to reduce the risk of falling would destroy 
the fun that patrons clearly sought. I view the case’s outcome as resting on the 
judgment that avoiding the harm would have been too great a burden in the 
specific instance (a no-breach conclusion), not as based on a predicted perverse 
social response (a no-duty conclusion). I say this because relying on perverse 
social responses as the rationale for finding no liability implies that there is a 
basis on which a jury could reasonably find the defendant at fault, and I just do 
not see what reasonable precaution the Flopper operators—or the bumper car 
operators in Nalwa, for that matter—were supposed to have taken. 
B. OTHER TIMES THE COURT EXTOLLED THE PRACTICAL BENEFITS OF TORT 
LIABILITY 
I do not want to leave the impression that pragmatic concerns have only 
been invoked by the court in recent years in support of defendants. When 
plaintiffs win, the opinions frequently contain statements by the court about the 
practical benefits of imposing liability. 
For example, in T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp., the plaintiffs 
sought to hold the original maker of a drug liable for failing to warn of a later-
discovered danger, even though the specific drug that harmed the plaintiffs was 
made by a different, generic drug maker; the original maker had both sold the 
rights to the product and ceased to manufacture it.112 The rationale for bringing 
the action against the brand-name drug developer was that the FDA does not 
permit makers of generic drugs to update their warnings unless the agency orders 
them to do so, while brand-name drug developers may unilaterally update their 
warnings as they discover previously unappreciated negative outcomes and then 
seek subsequent FDA approval.113 Once brand-name drug developers change 
their warnings, generic drug makers may follow suit.114 The court justified 
holding the brand-name drug maker liable on practical grounds, arguing that it 
was “not only in the best position to warn of a drug’s harmful effects” but was 
also “the only manufacturer with the unilateral authority under federal law to 
issue such a warning.”115  
 
 112. T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18, 23–24 (Cal. 2017). 
 113. Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e) (2020). 
 114. See T.H., 407 P.3d at 23–24; see also 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e). 
 115. T.H., 407 P.3d at 31. 
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The court also emphasized the ability of the defendant to avoid the harm at 
issue in Regents of University of California v. Superior Court, where a UCLA 
student, who the school knew suffered symptoms of schizophrenia, attacked 
another student in a classroom.116 Upholding UCLA’s liability for the victim’s 
injuries, the court observed that the school was in the best position to take 
precautions that would have prevented such an attack.117 And in Kesner v. 
Superior Court, where the asbestos fibers a worker inadvertently brought home 
on his clothes led to a household member developing an asbestos-related disease, 
the court pointed to the defendant’s role as an appropriate loss spreader to 
support its finding of liability.118 The defense objected to liability in these so-
called “take-home” asbestos exposure cases with the pragmatic argument that 
such liability would “dramatically increase the volume of asbestos litigation, 
undermine its integrity, and create enormous costs for the courts and 
community,” but the court rejected these predictions.119 Citing Justice Traynor’s 
concurrence in Escola, it asserted that the tort system contemplates that the cost 
of an injury will “be insured by the [defendant] and distributed among the public 
as a cost of doing business.”120 
Although the court seems hostile to juries in cases like Verdugo, the case 
involving Target’s lack of a defibrillator, at other times it seems quite 
comfortable with having juries perform their customary role in negligence cases. 
For example, in Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co., the victim was killed when his 
vehicle crashed into the defendant’s truck, which was parked on the shoulder of 
a freeway as the truck’s driver sat inside eating a snack.121 The defense claimed 
that imposing liability would cause hungry drivers to keep driving even if their 
hunger made their driving unsafe, thus creating even greater dangers to others 
on the road.122 The court dismissed this concern, stating that the defendant 
offered “no support for its assertion that juries cannot be trusted to weigh these 
considerations under the particular facts of each case, as they do in deciding 
negligence generally.”123  
The court’s decision in Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol similarly 
endorsed juries’ capability to determine questions of breach.124 There, the 
plaintiffs had been pulled over by a highway patrol officer into the center median 
strip of a highway when they were struck by a truck that had drifted out of its 
lane of traffic. 125 The court concluded that the question of whether the officer 
was negligent in selecting the location where he stopped the plaintiffs should 
 
 116. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court, 413 P.3d 656, 660 (Cal. 2018). 
 117. See id. at 668. 
 118. Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d at 288, 297. 
 119. Id. at 296. 
 120. Id. at 297 (citing Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)). 
 121. Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 248 P.3d at 1173. 
 122. Id. at 1182. 
 123. Id. at 1183. 
 124. Lugtu v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 28 P.3d 249, 250–63 (Cal. 2001). 
 125. Id. 
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have gone to the jury (the trial court had granted the defendant summary 
judgment).126 The court stated that enforcement officers owe a duty of care when 
they engage in “‘an affirmative act which places the person in peril or increases 
the risk of harm’” during the routine exercise of their authority.127 Appealing to 
pragmatism, the defense argued that “juries will be too ready to second-guess 
police officers in the exercise of their discretion in making traffic stops” and that 
the risk of liability would undermine effective traffic enforcement and/or impose 
“inordinate financial liability” on the state.128 But the court dismissed these 
predictions, asserting that the considerations officers take into account when 
making traffic stops could appropriately be assessed by jurors.129 The question 
of officer fault, as in negligence cases in general, was left for juries to resolve. 
C. CASES WHERE THE COURT CHOSE AMONG POSSIBLE DEFENDANTS OR 
DETERMINED THAT MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS COULD BE LIABLE 
I have already suggested that Gregory, the case involving the Alzheimer’s 
patient, and Priebe, the dog bite case, were decided for the defendant, at least in 
part, because the court believed that parties other than the defendants were in the 
best position to take appropriate precautions. By contrast, the court had no 
problem with potential liability for the highway patrol defendant in Lugtu even 
if it was a third party who carelessly crashed into the plaintiffs’ vehicle. 
Many of the premises liability cases have a similar structure. The plaintiff 
clearly would have a tort claim against some misbehaving and perhaps even 
criminal actor but is seeking to recover from the party in control of the property 
where the harm occurred. Presumably, this is because the otherwise most 
attractive defendant is judgment-proof. No fundamental problems with holding 
two different parties theoretically responsible for the same event arise when both 
should reasonably have acted to prevent it. Regents of University of California 
v. Superior Court, the UCLA student-on-student attack case, nicely 
demonstrates this. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School District is similar: 
there, the plaintiff sued the school district for negligence with respect to its 
hiring, training, and supervision of an employee who, the plaintiff claimed, 
sexually abused the plaintiff.130 
When the court tosses out a plaintiff’s claim against a second-best target, 
it is often because the court simply does not believe that the facts before it can 
be interpreted to support a finding of fault. Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd. is in this 
vein: the plaintiff was attacked in the underground garage of the defendant’s 
commercial building, and because there had been no similar past attacks that 
would have prompted the defendant to install additional safety precautions, the 
 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 257 (quoting Williams v. State of Cal., 664 P.2d 137, 140 (Cal. 1983)). 
 128. Id. at 260. 
 129. Id.  
 130. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 270 P.3d 699, 702–03 (Cal. 2012). 
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court found the defendant not liable.131 Its reasoning was similar in Wiener, 
where the motorist drove his vehicle through the fence around the defendant 
child care center without warning. 132 
By contrast, the court found it appropriate to hold a second potential 
defendant liable in at least some product injury cases. For example, in Ramos v. 
Brenntag Specialties, Inc., component part suppliers were not allowed to escape 
responsibility under the “component parts doctrine,” which shields makers of 
parts that are integrated into finished products from liability for injuries incurred 
by those finished products; this is because the claim in Ramos was that the 
specific defects that caused the injury were in the components themselves.133 
And in Kinsman v. Unocal Corp., an oil company landowner was held 
potentially liable for failing to warn of a hidden hazardous condition that it knew 
about and which harmed an employee of a contractor that the landowner hired 
to do work on the premises.134 Note the contrast with Johnson, where a 
technician’s product liability claim against an air conditioning equipment 
manufacturer was tossed out because the plaintiff was a “sophisticated user” and 
hence, not entitled to a warning of the risk that the technician’s exposure to 
phosgene gas could cause pulmonary fibrosis.135 
The major takeaway from this review of important personal injury and 
death cases decided in the past twenty years by the California Supreme Court is 
that the opinions are highly practical in their outlook. As the court struggles to 
apply basic fault principles to premises and motor vehicle injuries and to 
determine the boundaries of product liability law, the justices realize that simple 
moral principles often do not point to an obvious solution. Instead, they very 
often resolve the dispute before them through a pragmatic consideration of the 
practical implications of a finding for or against the victim.  
III.  HOW MIGHT JUSTICE TRAYNOR HAVE VOTED IN MORE RECENT CASES? 
As Professor Ursin explains in detail, Justice Traynor made clear his belief 
that it is judges’ role, and indeed their duty, to take current societal conditions 
into account when making decisions, including when interpreting statutes and 
the Constitution.136 Traynor believed, among other things, that judges “have a 
creative job to do when they find that a rule has lost its touch with reality and 
should be abandoned or reformulated to meet new conditions and new moral 
values.”137 
 
 131. Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd., 989 P.2d 121, 123, 127 (Cal. 1999). 
 132. Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Ctrs., Inc., 88 P.3d 517, 525 (Cal. 2004). 
 133. Ramos v. Brenntag Specialties, Inc., 372 P.3d 200, 205 (Cal. 2016). 
 134. Kinsman v. Unocal Corp., 123 P.3d 931, 946 (Cal. 2005). 
 135. Johnson v. Am. Standard, Inc., 179 P.3d 905, 914, 916–17 (Cal. 2008). 
 136. See generally Roger J. Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 
230 [hereinafter Traynor, Law and Social Change]; Roger J. Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do it Justice, 49 
CALIF. L. REV. 615 (1961). 
 137. Traynor, Law and Social Change, supra note 136, at 232. 
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In his 1965 article The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and 
Strict Liability, Traynor outlined how he believed the enterprise liability 
doctrine, which he had been championing and had finally been adopted by his 
court two years earlier in Greenman,138 could be extended to cover a much wider 
range of accidents.139 Critical of traditional fault-based doctrine, Traynor wrote:  
The development of strict liability for defective products, for industrial 
injuries covered by workmen’s compensation, and for injuries caused by 
ultra-hazardous activities, presages the abandonment of standing concepts of 
fault in accident cases. The significant innovations in product liability may 
well be carried over to such cases. On the highways alone injury and 
slaughter are not occasional events, but the order of the day, and sooner or 
later there is bound to be more rational distribution of their costs than is now 
possible under negligence.140  
Speaking more broadly, he wrote, “[t]he cases on products liability are 
emerging as early chapters of a modern history on strict liability that will take 
long in the writing.”141 
So far, Traynor’s predictions have not come to pass. Fault principles still 
dominate the common law of torts, and strict liability still only applies to 
defective products and ultra-hazardous activities.142 To be sure, even as those 
courts apply the fault principle, enterprise liability thinking has prompted them 
to expect enterprises to take more responsibility for harms they could have 
prevented, at least in some cases.143 However, that is a long way from what I 
believe Traynor expected and wanted. In this Part, I speculate about what a full 
embrace of the enterprise liability vision might have meant in my selection of 
the California Supreme Court’s important personal injury and death cases over 
the past twenty years. 
A. PREMISES LIABILITY CASES 
It turns out that a very large share of the important recent decisions can be 
viewed as premises liability cases, where enterprises are sued by their customers 
(or occasionally others) injured in conjunction with their use of the defendant’s 
property. 
In the immediate post-Traynor era, the California Supreme Court 
significantly liberalized premises liability law, making it much easier for 
plaintiffs to obtain judgments against landowners.144 To reiterate the outcome of 
 
 138. Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 1956 TENN. L. 
REV. 363, 367 (1965) (citing Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963)). 
 139. Id. at 375. 
 140. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 141. Id. at 376. 
 142. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 3–17 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. §§ 1–2, 20 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
 143. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability, 55 MD. L. REV. 
1190 (1996). 
 144. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). 
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Rowland, the court eliminated all of the old rules that called for separate 
treatment of invitees, licensees, and trespassers and concluded that an entrant’s 
status would no longer determine the landowner’s liability for the entrant’s 
injuries. Instead, each case would be addressed by the general principles of 
negligence law.145 While this made it easier for more victims to win, they still 
had to prove that the defendant had failed to take due care.146 
Suppose that we instead applied enterprise liability thinking to premises 
injuries. The idea is that those carrying on enterprise activities should take 
responsibility for harms that occur on their property as a cost of doing business, 
regardless of whether faulty conduct on their part can be demonstrated. Of 
course, recovery might be reduced if the victim was at fault.147 And perhaps 
premises occupiers held liable under enterprise liability could sometimes seek 
contribution from third parties. But the goal would be to incorporate harms to 
those who are on an enterprise’s premises into the enterprise’s cost of doing 
business, just as workplace injury costs are incorporated via workers’ 
compensation (when the victims are employees) and as product injury costs are 
incorporated via strict product liability. Indeed, in this vein, Professor Ursin has, 
in his earlier work, put forward the general case for strict liability for premises 
injuries.148 
In looking at recent decisions through an enterprise liability lens, one 
question to keep in mind is whether the “defect” requirement for product injuries 
would be carried over to premises injuries. If so, what would qualify as a 
“defect” not requiring proof of fault? Let’s see. 
In Ortega v. Kmart Corp., the plaintiff slipped on a puddle of milk on the 
floor of the defendant’s store.149 The jury found for the plaintiff, whose theory 
was fault-based: the milk had been on the floor long enough for Kmart, the 
defendant enterprise, to have discovered it and cleaned it up, but it had failed to 
do so. 150 The court affirmed, concluding that the matter of adequate notice was 
a question of fact that the jury could reasonably have decided in the plaintiff’s 
favor. 151 
If enterprise liability thinking were applied to the case, the defendant would 
be strictly liable for these sorts of harms on its premises. Moreover, it is easy to 
see how the premises could be deemed defective for having that slippery spot on 
the floor. The argument for enterprise liability here is that businesses like Kmart 
financially benefit from consumer traffic in their stores and can readily 
incorporate the cost of inevitable accidents like the one in this case into their 
 
 145. Id. at 568. 
 146. See id. 
 147. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1126, 1243 (Cal. 1975). 
 148. Edmund Ursin, Strict Liability for Defective Business Premises—One Step Beyond Rowland and 
Greenman, 22 UCLA L. REV. 820 (1975); see also VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING 
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 170–73 (1995). 
 149. Ortega v. Kmart Corp., 36 P.3d 11, 14 (Cal. 2001). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 19–20.  
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prices, charging each customer slightly more for the goods she purchases in 
return for what is in effect insurance against the risk that she is the unlucky one 
who falls and is hurt. Kmart products would thereby more fully reflect Kmart’s 
cost of doing business. Enterprise liability would create a clear financial 
incentive for Kmart to invest sensibly in measures to reduce this slip-and-fall 
risk. 
Hence, in this case, the outcome of applying enterprise liability thinking 
would be the same as the outcome the court reached applying fault principles. 
But other plaintiffs who could not prove that Kmart had adequate notice of the 
specific spill on which they slipped would succeed under an enterprise liability 
theory while losing under the fault regime. The court specifically rejected the 
strict liability solution in this case, asserting that “a store owner is not an insurer 
of the safety of its patrons.”152 This, I believe, conflicts with how Traynor would 
have anticipated the evolution of tort doctrine. 
Verdugo presents the potential to push the idea of enterprise liability 
further.153 The court conceded that Target owed the woman a duty of due care, 
but it rejected the wrongful death case brought by family members on the 
grounds that Target had no duty to provide the defibrillator that the plaintiffs 
claimed would have saved the decedent’s life. 154 I have already shown that this 
case was very dubiously decided and that in any event, the court’s conclusion 
can best be viewed as a finding of “no breach as a matter of law” rather than as 
a no-duty decision. But the point here is that enterprise liability could impose 
liability on Target, whether or not it was careless in its failure to have a 
defibrillator and an operator trained to use it on the premises. In lacking these, 
Target’s premises may be seen as defective. The cost of the customer’s death 
could be internalized into Target’s cost of business through the imposition of 
liability: the survivors of those who have the bad luck of dying in Target and 
similar stores would be compensated, and such stores would have a direct 
incentive to provide life-saving devices if their cost was reasonable. 
Two cases decided by the court in recent years involved injuries incurred 
during fights in the parking lots of bars/restaurants.155 Once more, imposing 
enterprise liability on businesses like these when injuries occur on their premises 
would result in strict liability to the victims. After all, the harms took place on 
the defendants’ property. Fights are arguably among the predictable 
consequences of serving alcohol, and more generally of gathering together 
people who on occasion will wind up in conflict with one another. Furthermore, 
one might indeed label a parking lot where one is attacked a defective location. 
Imposing liability regardless of fault would send a clear signal that this sort of 
enterprise should try to reduce the risk of violence on its premises, regardless of 
 
 152. Id. at 14. 
 153. Verdugo v. Target Corp., 327 P.3d 774, 786 (Cal. 2014). 
 154. Id. at 794–95. 
 155. Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, 113 P.32 1159 (Cal. 2005); see also Morris v. De La Torre, 113 P.3d 
1182 (Cal. 2005). 
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whether the specific harm could have been effectively prevented in a given 
instance. When injuries from third-party violence happen on a business’s 
property, the business’s liability insurance would provide recovery to the victim, 
and the cost of running such a business would slightly rise to cover this tort 
burden. As a result, the business would raise prices so that customers in effect 
would be buying insurance against the risk of violent injury when they 
patronized the business. 
In the actual twin cases from 2005, Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill and Morris 
v. De La Torre, the court again stuck firmly to the fault principle.156 It found that 
the defendant establishments did owe a duty of due care to protect their patrons 
from risks of attack by third-party criminal actors on the defendants’ premises.157 
But the court also ruled that the precautions fairly demanded of the establishment 
must only be reasonable actions, such as calling 911 for help in appropriate 
circumstances, and not unreasonably burdensome actions, such as always having 
security guards on duty even if there had not been attacks on the premises in the 
past; even calling 911 could be considered overly burdensome if doing so would 
be unsafe for the caller.158 Here again, we can see how enterprise liability 
thinking would routinely impose tort liability where application of the fault 
principle requires a fine-grained examination of the facts of each case, with the 
plaintiffs losing in some cases. 
Under enterprise liability thinking, landlords whose tenants are injured by 
criminal acts on the premises would be liable for that harm. Under current 
doctrine, as laid out in the Castaneda case in 2007, the victim has to prove that 
the landlord was at fault.159 In Castaneda, a mobile home park resident was 
injured by a stray bullet fired in the course of a gang fight involving another 
resident.160 Again, being shot while at home or in the common area of your rental 
facility could well lead one to describe the premises as defective. In the same 
vein as already discussed, landlord liability insurance could compensate victims, 
with the increased cost of insurance eventually passed on to tenants who in effect 
would buy protection against the risk that they might be such victims as part of 
their rent. Rent would more fully reflect the costs associated with the premises, 
and landlords would have a clear motivation to take steps to reduce risk to 
renters. By contrast, in Castaneda, the plaintiff lost for failure to provide 
adequate evidence specific to this event upon which a jury might have concluded 
that this landlord had failed to exercise due care. 
Castaneda follows the court’s earlier decision in Sharon P., in which the 
plaintiff, who worked in the commercial landlord defendant’s building, was 
sexually assaulted in the building’s underground garage and sued the landlord.161 
 
 156. Delgado, 113 P.32 at 1174–76. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 1169. 
 159. Castaneda v. Olsher, 162 P.3d 610, 619 (Cal. 2007). 
 160. Id. at 613–14. 
 161. Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd., 989 P. 2d 121, 123 (Cal. 1999).  
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The court ordered a judgment in favor of the defendant on the grounds that the 
garage’s history made it quite unexpected that such an attack would occur there, 
and thus, that requiring the defendant to hire a security guard was not a fair 
burden to impose on it—a classic no-breach decision (albeit one confusingly 
presented with “no duty” language).162 Were enterprise liability in place, then 
the harm to the plaintiff would have been part of the cost of being in the garage 
business, just as compensating victims of criminal attacks would be a cost of 
being in the mobile home park business in cases like Castaneda. 
Wiener is yet another example in this vein.163 Again, in Wiener, a childcare 
center was sued after someone intentionally drove his vehicle through a chain-
link fence around the center, killing two children and injuring others.164 Again, 
the court tossed out the case on unforeseeability grounds—in other words, it was 
a case of no breach, regardless of the language used by the court.165 Once more, 
enterprise liability points to labeling the center’s premises defective and 
imposing tort liability on the center. This would not only give childcare 
businesses vivid incentives concerning the safety of the children in their care but 
also provide victim compensation through the businesses’ liability insurance. 
The cost would be spread among the families who patronized them, who would 
in turn gain insurance against the small risk of their child being harmed in such 
a way. 
The two recent recreational injury cases further demonstrate the divergence 
of an enterprise liability approach from application of the fault principle. In 
Nalwa, where the plaintiff was injured while riding in a bumper car operated by 
her nine-year-old son at the defendant’s amusement park, the victim suffered a 
broken wrist when her car had a head-on crash with another bumper car during 
the ride.166 This could be deemed a defective amusement ride experience leading 
to strict liability under enterprise liability thinking. Such inevitable accident 
costs could be imposed on the park operators, with the compensation paid for by 
the park’s insurer and the costs passed on to patrons in the form of higher 
admission fees. All amusement park customers would thereby in effect buy 
insurance protection against the off chance of being injured. 
So too would enterprise liability thinking approach the injury in Shin 
altogether differently than the court did.167 Shin, which involved the golfer 
struck by another golfer’s ball shot from elsewhere on the course, concerned the 
application of California’s fault rules to lawsuits among participants in 
recreational activities.168 In Knight v. Jewett in 1992, the court had decided that 
fellow participants should only be held liable to each other if their conduct is 
considerably worse than merely negligent—that is, if it is so reckless as to be 
 
 162. Id. at 132. 
 163. Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Ctrs., Inc., 88 P.3d 517 (Cal. 2004). 
 164. Id. at 525. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 290 P.3d 1158, 1160 (Cal. 2012). 
 167. Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 584 (Cal. 2007). 
 168. Id. at 587. 
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“totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.”169 While 
often termed an “assumption of risk” case, Knight is a no-duty decision: it held 
that, in so far as tort law is concerned, it is permissible to carelessly injure a 
fellow recreational participant.170 The court’s dubious justification, discussed 
earlier, was that fear of being sued would cause Californians to stop engaging in 
highly socially desirable recreational activities, and in the interest of avoiding 
this perverse response, individual careless actors would be let off the hook. Shin 
applied Knight to golf.171  
Under enterprise liability thinking, the appropriate lawsuit over the injury 
in Shin would be against the operator of the golf course for an all-too-predictable 
injury that occurred on its premises, which were thereby arguably rendered 
defective. The same points already made in the other premises injury examples 
about cost internalization and safety promotion apply here. This approach might 
allow the merely negligent golfer to escape responsibility for causing injury, but 
unlike in Shin, the victim would be assured compensation. 
As for the two recent cases involving injuries to students hurt on school 
premises, it seems to me that although the defendant schools were public entities, 
there is no good reason not to think of them as “enterprises” for purposes of 
applying enterprise liability. Hence, once more, rather than hinging recovery on 
proof of negligence by employees of the schools, enterprise liability thinking 
would simply hold universities and school districts liable for harms to their 
students that occurred on their premises.  
Revisiting the 2018 case, Regents of University of California v. Superior 
Court, the court made clear that the university owed a duty of due care to the 
victim, and that the trial judge had therefore erred in dismissing the lawsuit.172 
The student who attacked a peer in chemistry lab had been treated for 
schizophrenia by UCLA health officials.173 Whether the plaintiff could 
convincingly show that UCLA was at fault in some way was left for 
consideration on remand.174 In C.A. in 2012, the court made clear that a school 
district has a duty to its students to take due care to prevent harm to them, in this 
case to prevent the sexual abuse of the plaintiff by a school district employee 
(here stemming from the district’s alleged negligence with respect to the hiring, 
retention, and/or supervision of the employee).175 Again, whether the school 
district was actually at fault in this matter was left to be determined at trial.176 
As we have seen throughout this review of premises-based injuries, enterprise 
liability guarantees victim compensation while fault-based doctrine does not, so 
 
 169. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 710 (Cal. 1992). 
 170. See id. 
 171. In Shin, the victim actually argued that the defendant golfer had acted recklessly, and hence, the matter 
was sent back to the trial court for that issue to be resolved. Id. at 584. 
 172. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court, 413 P.3d 656, 674 (Cal. 2018). 
 173. Id. at 660–63. 
 174. Id. at 660. 
 175. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 270 P.3d 699, 708 (Cal. 2012). 
 176. Id. at 711 (remanding the case). 
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that in many instances the plaintiff loses the case when fault principles are 
applied. 
Inevitably, there are borderline issues regarding premises liability. 
Vasilenko in 2017 and Kesner in 2016, the latter of which I will discuss shortly, 
nicely illustrate this. In Vasilenko, the victim had parked in the defendant 
church’s overflow parking lot on his way to the church.177 To get to the church 
itself, he had to cross a busy street, and while doing so, he was struck by a car.178 
He sued the church.179 Since the injury did not occur on the actual premises of 
the defendant but rather while the plaintiff was predictably crossing from one 
portion of the church’s premises to another, it is fair to ask whether this is a 
premises liability case at all.180 
Since commercial parking lots can sometimes be held liable under the fault 
system for negligently discharging parkers into oncoming traffic, be it pedestrian 
or vehicular,181 it seems to me that operating an overflow parking lot in a way 
that routinely forces congregants to cross a busy street could be viewed 
analogously. Once that point is conceded, enterprise liability would assure a 
victim recovery in tort from the church’s insurer for a premises-related injury. 
The court, however, adopted a much stronger pro-defendant position in 
Vasilenko, concluding that the church had no duty at all to protect its visitors 
against traffic accidents on public property.182 It seems to me that at least some 
readily imaginable victims could demonstrate fault if permitted to so argue. For 
example, it does not seem very burdensome for a church to engage a traffic 
crossing guard for a couple of hours on Sunday before and after services. This 
would be analogous to the widespread deployment of school crossing guards at 
busy intersections adjacent to schools without traffic signals before and after 
school. However, the court was concerned that any possibility of liability at all 
would cause landowners like the defendant church to stop providing parking 
lots, to everyone’s detriment.183 Were that prediction true, then perhaps it would 
be justifiable to deny recovery (under any theory) on the argument that the legal 
interests of victims like the plaintiff are best sacrificed for the wider social good. 
Absent evidence to support the court’s fears of such a perverse social response, 
 
 177. Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church, 404 P.3d 1196, 1198 (Cal. 2017). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. A separate issue raised by enterprise liability is whether a church should be considered an enterprise 
and held strictly liable in the way that I am assuming commercial actors would be. Since churches can and should 
obtain liability insurance just like business enterprises, I don’t have a problem with putting churches in the same 
category. They might have to increase member dues and/or solicit more voluntary contributions to cover the tort 
burden, but in most instances, this would mean that congregation members who pay more would be protected in 
case they were injured in connection with the church’s premises. 
 181. But see Pulka v. Edelman, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1023 (N.Y. 1976) (“If a rule of law were established so 
that liability would be imposed in an instance such as this, it is difficult to conceive of the bounds to which 
liability logically would flow.”). 
 182. Vasilenko, 404 P.3d at 1208. 
 183. Id. at 1202. 
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however, I think one can be highly skeptical that liability here, including 
enterprise liability, would lead businesses to stop offering parking. 
In considering the appropriateness of imposing liability on the church 
under an enterprise liability way of thinking, analogous treatment of claims 
under workers’ compensation might be enlightening. For example, in Lewis v. 
Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board in 1975, after an employee was injured 
on public property located between his employer’s parking lot and the worksite, 
he filed a successful compensation claim.184 In general, under workers’ 
compensation, the “going and coming” rule precludes recovery by workers who 
are injured on their way to work or on their way home after work.185 After all, at 
those times, the employer is hardly in control. But once employees are at work 
and are then injured, they are covered.186 In Lewis, the court concluded that the 
employee started work once he entered the parking lot, so he was on the job 
while routinely traveling between the lot and the business premises, even though 
that involved crossing a public road.187 
By contrast, in General Insurance Co. v. Compensation Appeals Board in 
1976, the court ruled against a worker who arrived at his workplace and parked 
on a public street in front of the facility where he was then struck by a passing 
motorist as he got out of his car.188 The court concluded that this employee had 
not yet arrived at work and that the going and coming rule therefore blocked his 
claim.189 His place of work imposed no requirement or necessity that he park 
where he did, and so the court did not invoke the “special risk” exception to the 
going and coming rule, which supports worker recovery in cases where the 
conditions of employment have subjected a claimant to a heightened risk not 
otherwise clearly associated with the employment.190  
These are not easy lines to draw, but it is quite possible that under 
enterprise liability, the church’s responsibility for the safety of its parishioners 
in Vasilenko would begin once they park on church premises—including in the 
annex lot—and start making their way to the church building itself. 191 
A very different boundary issue arose in the Gregory case, where the in-
home care worker was injured when the Alzheimer’s patient she cared for, a 
patient the worker knew had violent tendencies, reached for a knife that fell on 
the care worker’s arm as she attempted to restrain the patient.192 Seeking to 
preclude liability against the patient or her husband, who had chosen to have her 
cared for at home rather than in an institution, the court decided that the couple 
owed no duty to the worker to prevent harms related to the patient’s 
 
 184. Lewis v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 542 P.2d 225, 226 (Cal. 1975). 
 185. Id. at 225. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 229. 
 188. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 546 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Cal. 1976). 
 189. Id. at 1364–65. 
 190. Id. at 1364; see, e.g., Greydanus v. Indus. Acc. Comm’n, 407 P.2d 296, 298–99 (Cal. 1965). 
 191. Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church, 404 P.3d 1196, 1208 (Cal. 2017). 
 192. Gregory v. Cott, 331 P.3d 179, 181 (Cal. 2014). 
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Alzheimer’s.193 The court feared—perhaps reasonably, perhaps not—that 
imposing liability would make people feel compelled to institutionalize their ill 
relatives, a result that neither the family members of ill people nor society really 
favored.194 
The court decided that the better way to think about this matter was to ask 
where the victim should properly have sought compensation.195 It concluded that 
this was through a workers’ compensation claim against her employer.196 Not 
only would such a claim have assured her compensation, it would have put 
responsibility for her injury on the employer, the party best positioned to reduce 
the risk of violence by patients through careful training of its workers. The 
defendant husband and wife, meanwhile, were not an enterprise. The existence 
of a relevant enterprise better situated to deal with compensation and risk 
reduction cut against imposing strict liability on the couple, even though the 
harm happened on their property. 
In somewhat the same vein is the Priebe case, where a dog owned by the 
defendant bit an employee of a kennel where the dog was boarding.197 The court 
in this case considered the plaintiff’s statutory strict liability claim: existing tort 
doctrine imposes strict liability on dog owners when their dogs bite third 
parties.198 The court concluded that the common law veterinarian’s rule, under 
which dog owners are not liable if their dogs bite or injure veterinarians during 
treatment, extended to scenarios in which dogs bite or injure kennel workers.199 
Notice that this is a case of an injury not on the dog owner’s premises but 
on the premises of the plaintiff’s employer.200 Notice, too, that while the dog 
owner was not an enterprise, the plaintiff was part of one.201 Like in the case of 
the Alzheimer’s patient,202 enterprise liability thinking indicates that there is an 
enterprise best suited to taking precautions against the injury at issue (through 
worker training) and to compensating those like the victim (its employees). And 
so, once more, the finger of enterprise liability might well properly point in the 
direction of the plaintiff collecting from her employer under workers’ 
compensation. 
In Priebe, the court noted in passing that a different result would follow if 
the dog owner knew his dog was vicious but failed to warn the kennel staff.203 
 
 193. Id. at 192. 
 194. Id. at 185. 
 195. Id. at 192. 
 196. Id.  
 197. Priebe v. Nelson, 140 P.3d 848, 850 (Cal. 2006). 
 198. See id. at 855; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3342(a) (2020) (“The owner of any dog is liable for the 
damages suffered by any person who is bitten by the dog while in a public place or lawfully in a private place, 
including the property of the owner of the dog, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner’s 
knowledge of such viciousness.”). 
 199. Priebe, 140 P.3d at 856. 
 200. Id. at 850. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Gregory v. Cott, 331 P.3d 179, 181 (Cal. 2014). 
 203. Priebe, 140 P.3d at 850. 
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Even a court explicitly applying enterprise liability thinking might similarly 
conclude that the kennel operators would not be an appropriate party to deal with 
this problem if they did not know that the dog in their care was dangerous and 
the owner did. 
A similar issue arose in the 2005 case Kinsman, where an employee of a 
contractor who came to the defendant’s premises to do some work sued the 
enterprise-owner of the premises for failing to warn of a concealed hazardous 
condition on the property.204 The court agreed that if a negligent failure to 
disclose could be shown, the victim could recover from the landowner.205 From 
the enterprise liability perspective, absent the warning, it might well seem more 
suitable for the enterprise-owner of the premises to cover the cost of the injury 
at issue, instead of the enterprise-employer of the victim covering the cost via 
workers’ compensation. 
My takeaway is that help-providing businesses like the kennel in Priebe, 
the home care agency in Gregory, and the contractor that sent its employee to 
do work for the defendant in Kinsman, are entitled to know of the danger they 
shoulder before their enterprise is the one into which costs of resulting injuries 
to their employees are internalized. 
Kesner in 2016 involved two similar lawsuits where people who worked 
with asbestos inevitably brought home asbestos fibers, usually on their clothes, 
and household members, including a wife and a nephew, were injured by 
breathing in those fibers.206 The victims sued the workers’ employers.207 While 
these were a sort of mixed premises liability/product liability pair of cases, the 
court observed on the premises side that “liability for harm caused by substances 
that escape an owner’s property is well established in California law.”208 The 
court concluded that harm to household members was, in general, sufficiently 
predictable, and that those who used asbestos in their commercial operations 
should take responsibility for preventing employee household member harm.209 
If they failed to exercise the appropriate due care in this, they would be held 
liable in tort (the court made clear that only household members and not 
members of the public in general are to be protected by this conclusion).210 
From the enterprise liability perspective, once again we can sensibly attach 
liability to those enterprises from which the deadly asbestos fibers emanated, 
calling the premises defective when they allow people to leave with the 
dangerous fibers on their clothes. Hence, under enterprise liability, the Kesner 
defendants would be liable whether or not the plaintiffs could show some 
specific form of carelessness by the defendant in allowing household member 
 
 204. Kinsman v. Unocal Corp., 123 P.3d 931, 946 (Cal. 2005).  
 205. Id. at 937. 
 206. Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 288, 297 (Cal. 2016). 
 207. Id. at 288–89. 
 208. Id. at 301. Why a similar sort of off-premises analysis was not applied in Vasilenko v. Grace Family 
Church, the church parking lot case, is not clear to me. 
 209. Id. at 394. 
 210. Id.  
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asbestos exposure. Indeed, this is the same strict liability result we reach if we 
characterize these cases as involving defective product injuries. 
A final premises liability case is City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 
where a developmentally disabled child drowned while participating in a city 
recreational program for disabled children.211 Under enterprise liability thinking, 
surely the city could readily be viewed as an enterprise and liable for injuries on 
city property for the reasons given above. However, a caveat here is that federal 
and state tort claims acts generally reject strict liability against the deepest of 
pockets and ablest cost spreaders. 
This case, of course, was brought under the fault doctrine. The parents had 
signed a full waiver of tort liability, which the city had insisted upon as a 
condition of their daughter’s enrollment in the program.212 The court did not 
decide whether a waiver of liability for ordinary negligence would be valid, but 
rather only focused on whether a waiver of claims for gross negligence would 
be upheld.213 It concluded that it would not: even the government could not 
validly obtain a waiver of its liability for gross negligence.214 The parents here 
only claimed gross negligence by the counselor who was supposed to be 
watching their daughter, and so the case was remanded to address this claim.215 
City of Santa Barbara raises the question of whether an enterprise liability 
approach would uphold no releases from tort liability, all releases from tort 
liability, or only some, as the court suggested here. My sense is that enterprise 
liability is strongly inconsistent with liability waivers, which might routinely be 
sought in premises injury settings if they were allowed and thereby undermine 
enterprise liability goals. However, liability waivers can still be useful in this 
context if parties understand and agree that potential victims can readily obtain 
relief from a different enterprise than the one presenting the waiver. In this 
scenario, waivers can help guide courts to the right source of compensation and 
risk reduction without the courts having to choose among potential defendants. 
B. PRODUCT LIABILITY CASES 
Among the more recent cases are four product liability cases, all of which 
raise the boundary question: which enterprise should take financial 
responsibility for the type of accident at issue before the courts? Enterprise 
liability thinking can sensibly resolve this question as well. 
In the 2017 case T.H., minors were injured in utero when their mothers 
took a generic asthma medication.216 Their product liability claim rested on the 
theory that their mothers had not received an adequate warning about the drug’s 
 
 211. City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 161 P.3d 1095, 1096 (Cal. 2007). 
 212. Id. at 1097, n.3. 
 213. Id. at 1115. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18, 22 (Cal. 2017). 
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risks.217 But this decision concerned their claims against the original developer 
and seller of the drug, not the maker of the drug their mothers actually used.218  
Again, the rationale for bringing the action against the brand-name drug 
developer was that under FDA law, makers of bio-equivalent generic drugs are 
not allowed to update their warnings unless so ordered by the FDA, whereas 
brand-name drug developers may unilaterally update their warnings as they 
discover previously unappreciated negative outcomes and then seek subsequent 
FDA approval.219 Once brand-name drug developers change their warnings, 
generic drug makers may follow suit.220 
Under current doctrinal thinking, focusing responsibility on the generic 
drug sellers would leave victims of defective drugs with no legal remedy and 
would not push the industry toward a norm of rapidly updating warnings. 
Instead, by imposing an ongoing responsibility on the enterprise that first 
developed and patented a drug, the law maximizes the chances of prompt 
updates and provides victims with compensation for harm caused by an 
enterprise’s failure to provide those prompt updates. It might at first seem harsh 
to hold a company liable for the harm done by a drug it may no longer make or 
sell. But the thinking here is that after bringing the product to market and 
profiting from its patent, the initial developer has a responsibility to maintain an 
appropriate warning via the FDA regime even if it has stopped making the drug 
and/or sold its rights to make and sell it. 
Note, however, that plaintiffs only win under current law if they show that 
the brand-name company knew or reasonably should have known of the newly 
discovered dangers of a drug and sent out a warning about them. Under 
enterprise liability thinking, a drug could be seen as defective simply because it 
resulted in harm and regardless of whether an inadequate warning had been 
supplied. This way of dealing with drug injuries would apply not just in the 
exotic scenario where the company that developed a drug no longer makes or 
sells it and is nonetheless sued. It would apply to straightforward situations in 
which a firm markets a drug but is not plausibly aware of the risks it poses and 
users are injured, or in which a firm markets a drug, the firm is well aware of the 
risks the drug poses, and users are fully warned against those risks. While 
product liability law today does not impose the loss on the drug maker in either 
instance, enterprise liability thinking seemingly would in both—on the grounds 
that all users will fairly pay somewhat more for the drug so that those among 
them who have the bad luck to be injured by the drug can be compensated. That 
said, even under enterprise liability thinking, it is not easy to resolve whether the 
generic drug maker, the brand-name drug developer, or possibly both would be 
liable for the drug’s harm to victims. Consideration of which party has most 
control over risk given the FDA rules might point to the brand-name developer, 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e) (2020). 
 220. See id.  
SUGARMAN-71.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/20  3:35 PM 
1012 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:975 
while consideration of which party can most easily internalize costs might point 
to the generic drug maker. 
In O’Neil in 2012, the court decided the matter a different way than in T.H., 
when the plaintiffs in O’Neil sought to corral a party that did not make the actual 
product that killed a naval officer.221 The victim died from asbestos, and the 
lawsuit was brought against the manufacturer of valves and pumps used in 
aircraft carriers.222 There was nothing wrong with the valves and pumps; it was 
the asbestos placed adjacent to them that emitted fibers that in turn killed the 
naval officer.223 The court’s view was that this death was not properly the 
responsibility of the valve and pump maker, even if it was the routine heat from 
the valves and pumps that prompted the release of the asbestos fibers.224 The 
responsibility instead was with the employer (from whom the victim’s family 
had the military equivalent of workers’ compensation benefits) and/or with 
whichever company had manufactured the asbestos (which by this time was 
probably bankrupt).225 An enterprise liability approach would likely call this the 
same way.  
Johnson in 2008 and Webb v. Special Electric Co. Inc. in 2016 both 
concerned the so-called “sophisticated user” defense.226 These cases centered on 
who should have been warning whom. In Johnson, a technician developed 
pulmonary fibrosis from exposure to phosgene gas while maintaining and 
repairing air conditioning units.227 He sued the equipment manufacturer for 
failing to warn him of the danger.228 The court concluded that, given his training 
and experience, the victim must have known or should have known of the 
dangers in the first place, and that the equipment maker thus had no obligation 
to warn him of them.229 His remedy was presumably through workers’ 
compensation from his employer. Enterprise liability thinking may well reach 
the same result. Given their responsibility for training workers to be 
sophisticated technicians, perhaps employers like the one in Johnson are better 
suited to deal with both risk reduction and compensation than are the makers of 
equipment that is presumably located on the premises of some customer of the 
manufacturer. 
In Webb, another asbestos case, the plaintiff had worked as a pipefitter for 
Johns-Manville, once a huge player in the world of asbestos but by then long 
bankrupt.230 The asbestos that made the plaintiff ill was actually provided to 
 
 221. O’Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987, 991 (Cal. 2012). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 997, 1005. 
 225. Id. at 1005. 
 226. Johnson v. Am. Standard, Inc., 179 P.3d 905, 909 (Cal. 2008); see also Webb v. Special Elec. Co., Inc., 
370 P.3d 1022, 1031 (Cal. 2016). 
 227. Johnson, 179 P.3d at 908–09. 
 228. Johnson, 179 P.3d at 909. 
 229. Johnson, 179 P.3d at 909, 915. 
 230. Webb, 370 P.3d at 1028. See generally Craig Calhoun & Henryk Hiller, Coping with Insidious Injuries: 
The Case of Johns-Manville Corporation and Asbestos Exposure, 35 SOC. PROBLEMS 162 (1988). 
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Johns-Manville by the defendant, Special Electric.231 Special Electric argued 
that Johns-Manville was a sophisticated user/intermediary, and so it was Johns-
Manville’s responsibility to warn its own employees of the dangers of 
asbestos.232 While the jury did apportion 49% of the fault in failing to adequately 
warn to Johns-Manville, it also apportioned 18% to Special Electric for its 
failure to warn.233 While one might understandably assume that Johns-Manville 
knew of the dangers of asbestos and that it was its responsibility to warn its own 
employees of them (à la the result in Johnson v. American Standard, Inc.), the 
court here concluded that the jury could reasonably find that Special Electric 
neither “actually and reasonably” relied on Johns-Manville to warn its 
employees, nor routinely provided adequate warnings to Johns-Manville.234 
Hence, the court upheld the jury’s verdict. While the facts are somewhat murky 
here, my sense is that enterprise liability thinking would point to Johns-Manville 
and not the defendant as the appropriate enterprise to take responsibility for 
reducing this injury risk and providing compensation.  
The special history of asbestos litigation, in which parties have frantically 
looked further and further afield for new, solvent defendants to sue, may play a 
special role in these matters.235 However, what is worth noting is that asbestos 
is probably going to be viewed as a defective product from an enterprise liability 
perspective even if it carries a warning about its dangers, such that its victims 
are eligible for compensation without proof of fault—such as proof of 
inadequate warning—from some suitable enterprise participant. 
The 2016 Ramos case, where the plaintiff sued component part makers for 
causing his pulmonary fibrosis, is another example of the boundary question.236 
The court’s general rule is that when a product is defective, the proper defendant 
is the final product maker, not makers of component parts. But in Ramos, the 
court concluded that the component parts doctrine was inapplicable since the 
victim was not complaining about a defective final product, but rather about 
something specifically wrong with the defendants’ component products 
themselves.237 Given that the component part makers were best equipped to take 
precautions against the harm at issue, an enterprise liability approach would 
likely yield the same result that the court reached here. 
C. MOTOR VEHICLE CASES 
Revisiting the 2011 case Cabral, an automobile driver crashed into a 
tractor-trailer parked on the side of the road, killing the driver of the 
 
 231. Webb, 370 P.3d at 1027–28. 
 232. Id. at 1031. 
 233. Id. at 1028–29. 
 234. Id. at 1036, 1038. 
 235. For an analysis of the role of asbestos litigation in the evolution of asbestos injury compensation, see 
JEB BARNES & THOMAS F. BURKE, HOW POLICY SHAPES POLITICS: RIGHTS, COURTS, LITIGATION, AND THE 
STRUGGLE OVER INJURY COMPENSATION (2015). 
 236. Ramos v. Brenntag Specialties, Inc., 372 P.3d 200, 203 (Cal. 2016). 
 237. Id. at 205–06. 
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automobile.238 In the lawsuit brought by his widow, a jury found the tractor-
trailer operator 10% at fault and the decedent auto driver 90% at fault.239 After 
the appellate court tossed out the verdict, the California Supreme Court reversed, 
finding that there was adequate evidence for the jury to have properly reached 
the conclusion it did: parking on the side of the freeway could have been 
negligence that contributorily caused the accident.240 
For my purposes, the main point to emphasize is that Traynor envisioned 
that something would replace the fault-based system for dealing with motor 
vehicle accidents. He published The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products 
and Strict Liability the same year that Robert Keeton and Jeffrey O’Connell 
published their detailed proposal for an auto no-fault scheme.241 Other talk about 
auto no-fault was in the air at that time.242 Although Traynor did not focus on 
this solution, there is every reason to think that he would have supported some 
sort of first-party insurance replacement for tort law. In 1977, the Canadian 
province of Quebec adopted a comprehensive auto no-fault plan that remains in 
place today and which provides prompt and generous compensation to virtually 
all motor vehicle accident victims, regardless of whether or not some other 
driver was at fault.243 But no U.S. state has followed the Quebec model.244  
In the other motor vehicle case, Lugtu, a car was pulled over onto a 
highway median strip by a highway patrol officer and was struck by a truck that 
drifted out of its traffic lane.245 The lawsuit was brought by passengers in the 
pulled-over vehicle who were injured in the crash against the officer for 
carelessly choosing a dangerous spot to deal with the driver.246 The court 
concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to have a jury determine whether or 
not the officer had been at fault.247 Once more, under an auto no-fault plan like 
that in Quebec, this would not be a relevant issue. Victims of motor vehicle 
accidents would simply be compensated regardless of how the accident came 
about. 
With the coming of self-driving vehicles, the prospect of shifting away 
from our current regime to some sort of no-fault plan or automaker strict liability 
seems more plausible.248 One recent proposal involves replacing negligence-
 
 238. Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 248 P.3d 1170, 1173 (Cal. 2011).  
 239. Id. at 1172. 
 240. Id. at 1178. 
 241. Robert E. Keeton & Jeffrey O’Connell, Basic Protection: A New Plan of Automobile Insurance, 32 
J. RISK & INS. 539 (1965); see also Traynor, supra note 138.  
 242. See, e.g., Albert A. Ehrenzweig,“Full Aid” Insurance for the Traffic Victim—A Voluntary 
Compensation Plan, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 329 (1955). 
 243. Stephen D. Sugarman, Quebec’s Comprehensive Auto No-Fault Scheme and the Failure of Any of the 
United States to Follow, 39 LES CAHIERS DE DRIOT 303, 317 (1998). 
 244. Id. at 305.  
 245. Lugtu v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 28 P.3d 249, 250 (Cal. 2001). 
 246. Id. at 251. 
 247. Id. at 263. 
 248. Daniel A. Crane et al., A Survey of Legal Issues Arising from the Deployment of Autonomous and 
Connected Vehicles, 23 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 191, 260 (2017); Kenneth S. Abraham & Robert L. 
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based auto liability with a single automaker enterprise liability system that 
would apply not only to driverless vehicles but to all vehicles.249 Such a proposal 
would move the largest category of existing physical injury tort claims out of 
the fault system and into something that Traynor would probably have 
applauded. 
D. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON HOW TRAYNOR MIGHT HAVE VIEWED 
MODERN TORT LAW 
We know a lot more about how tort law functions in practice than we did 
when Traynor was writing about using tort to create a social insurance benefit, 
and our U.S. safety net, while still containing all too many holes, is now much 
thicker than it was back then. Were Traynor aware of the enormous 
administrative costs associated with running the modern tort system, it is 
uncertain that he would favor using tort in the same way today as he then 
imagined. A somewhat more comprehensive national health insurance plan than 
has been achieved via the Affordable Care Act and somewhat more generous 
Social Security disability benefits than we have today would together go a very 
long way to providing just what Traynor sought: coverage for the medical 
expenses of accident victims (and those disabled in other ways) and reasonable 
replacement of their lost income. 
To be sure, tort law also carries compensation for pain and suffering, 
something that is not normally included in social insurance benefits (although it 
should be noted that Quebec’s auto no-fault plan does provide reasonably 
generously for pain and suffering to those suffering serious auto injuries).250 Yet, 
Traynor might well have seen the absence of pain and suffering compensation 
as a fair trade-off for prompt and generous compensation for so-called hard 
economic losses. After all, in the famous Seffert case, he objected when a 
woman, badly injured when a bus carelessly pulled away with her only partially 
on board, recovered from a jury pain and suffering damages several times as 
much as her other losses.251 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have shown that the emphasis on pragmatism espoused by 
Justice Roger Traynor has prevailed in California tort cases involving personal 
injury and death. But it has not prevailed in ways that Traynor predicted or likely 
would have preferred. Over the past twenty years, the California Supreme Court 
has frequently deployed pragmatic considerations in the service of denying 
victims tort recovery. The court seems especially taken with its predictions of 
the doom it believes it would incur were it to hold for certain classes of plaintiffs. 
 
Rabin, Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer Responsibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, 
105 VA. L. REV. 127, 154 (2019). 
 249. Kyle D. Logue, Should Automakers Be Responsible for Accidents?, REG., Spring 2019, at 20, 21. 
 250. Sugarman, supra note 243, at 319–320. 
 251. Seffert v. L.A. Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 339, 344 (Cal. 1961). 
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While these predictions are pragmatic in nature, they hardly promote the use of 
tort law to assure compensation of accident victims, especially those victims 
with claims against enterprises that profit from the activities that cause those 
accidents (whether or not the individuals carrying out activities on behalf of 
those enterprises were at fault). 
I have registered my doubts here about the reliability of the doomsday 
predictions offered in support of defendant victories. And I have further 
registered my strong doctrinal objection to the court’s pattern of shoving no-
breach decisions into the “no duty” box, thereby depriving juries of their proper 
opportunity to resolve whether there was a breach of the duty of care a defendant 
did indeed owe to the plaintiff. This doctrinal clumsiness is at odds with the 
American Law Institute’s perspective as reflected in the Restatement of Torts 
(Third). In my view, it has also contributed to the scholarly perspective that our 
court is no longer the leading state judicial body in the resolution of new issues 
in personal injury and death cases. This turn would have been terribly 
disappointing to Traynor. 
In sum, not only has Traynor’s enterprise-liability-oriented pragmatism 
failed to carry the day, but also the whole wave of doctrinal reform that 
enterprise liability itself could have led has flattened out. Our court now seems 
very firmly committed to fault-based tort law for much of its reach in personal 
injury and death cases. It need not have played out that way.  
I also showed that a true embrace of enterprise liability could have resulted 
in much more sweepingly pro-plaintiff tort law than we now have. Most 
importantly, this alternate legal landscape could have featured full responsibility 
of entrepreneurial land possessors (and occupiers) for harms that occur on their 
premises, regardless of whether they could or should have reasonably prevented 
those harms. Furthermore, California could easily have moved to treat motor 
vehicle accident victims as they are in treated in Quebec and some other 
Canadian provinces—quickly and efficiently providing coverage for their 
medical expenses, replacing much of their income loss, and even paying out 
something extra for those suffering major injuries, without regard to the question 
of fault. Such an approach would leave it to other mechanisms such as the 
criminal law to punish bad driving where appropriate. 
Yet this has not come to pass for now and does not even appear to be a dim 
light on the horizon, recent political developments notwithstanding. Just as 
Governor Jerry Brown was finishing his last year in office at the end of 2018, he 
appointed a fourth member to our court. For the first time since 1986, a majority 
of the sitting justices were appointed by a Democrat, and indeed, it was not until 
fairly late in Brown’s second round as governor that even two of the sitting 
justices were his appointees. Will this make a difference in the court’s 
receptivity to enterprise liability thinking? It is difficult to predict, but so far 
there is no good evidence that the Brown appointees will come to see things as 
Traynor did.  
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We really only have early evidence about one of them, and that is Justice 
Goodwin Liu, a former colleague and personal friend of mine. Justice Liu has 
written and joined enough opinions by now to suggest that his creative thinking 
and analysis is adding nuance to a basically fault-dominated regime. That said, 
in deciding accidental injury cases, he seems far more attentive to the “cheapest 
cost avoider” principle articulated by Judge and Professor Guido Calabresi as a 
driver of conduct than to the Traynor view of tort as a compensation device.252 
There are no opinions like Traynor’s concurrence in Escola to be found in the 
recent case law.  
But who knows? As the new majority of Brown judicial appointees settles 
in, these four might as a group re-think the suitability of enterprise liability in 
tort as a way of dealing with personal injury and death cases in the twenty-first 
century. Possibly Traynor’s pragmatism could rise again if we give it enough 
time. Of course, our legislature, dominated as it is by members of the Democratic 
Party, could move California law in that direction by statute. But I would not 
count on that. So long as most of the plaintiffs’ personal injury bar is committed 
to sticking with the status quo, and so long as those lawyers are important 
campaign contributors to the legislators with the power to initiate changes, the 
sweeping legislative embrace of enterprise liability Traynor once imagined will 
likely remain out of reach. 
  
 
 252. See Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church, 404 P.3d 1196, 1198 (Cal. 2017); Kesner v. Superior Court, 
384 P.3d 283, 290 (Cal. 2016); Gregory v. Cott, 331 P.3d 179, 192–93 (Cal. 2014) (Liu, J., concurring). 
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